Simplifying the Standard of Review in North Carolina Administrative Appeals by Ludington, Sarah H.
Simplifying the Standard of Review in North Carolina 
Administrative Appeals
By Sarah H. Ludington*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 587 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF SUPERIOR COURT JURISDICTION OVER 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS ...................................................... 591 
A. The Appellate and Original Jurisdiction of the North Carolina 
Superior Courts .................................................................... 591 
B. The Default Rule: Appellate Jurisdiction as Determined by the 
APA ....................................................................................... 593 
1. The Standard of Review Under the Superior Court’s Appellate 
Jurisdiction............................................................................ 594 
2. The De Novo Standard of Review ........................................ 596 
3. The Whole Record Standard of Review ............................... 600 
a. Not Supported by Substantial Evidence......................... 600 
b. Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion .......... 605 
C. Three Exceptions to the Default Rule of Appellate 
Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 606 
1. Agencies Exempt from the APA .......................................... 607 
2. Appeals from Final Agency Decisions Where the Agency has 
Not Adopted an Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended 
Decision ................................................................................ 608 
3. Agencies with Agency-Specific Judicial Review Statutes ... 610 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLIFYING, CLARIFYING, AND 
STANDARDIZING AGENCY-SPECIFIC STATUTES PROVIDING FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW..................................................................... 610 
A. More Procedure than is Due?  Agency-Specific Review 
Statutes Conferring Original or Hybrid Jurisdiction in the 
Superior Courts .................................................................... 612 
1. Revision recommended ........................................................ 617 
a. Statutes Enacted Prior to the APA ................................. 617 
b. Statutes Conferring Hybrid Original/Appellate 
586 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
Jurisdiction..................................................................... 619 
c. Initial Decision Not Made by an Agency or Officer in the 
Executive Branch ........................................................... 622 
d. Agency Decision Made Without an Opportunity for In-
Person Hearing............................................................... 625 
e. Review Provisions in the North Carolina Business 
Corporations Act and North Carolina Business Nonprofit 
Act.................................................................................. 628 
2. No Revision Recommended ................................................. 631 
B. Agency-Specific Judicial Review Statutes Conferring Appellate 
Jurisdiction on the Superior Courts ..................................... 632 
IV. CONCLUSION............................................................................. 636 
Fall 2013 Simplifying the Standard of Review 587
I. INTRODUCTION
Uniformity is frequently cited as the hallmark of any fair 
system of justice, crucial to providing its rationality, predictability, 
coherence, and legitimacy. 1 The legislature enacted the North 
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1973 with the 
express purpose of establishing “a uniform system of administrative 
rulemaking and adjudicatory procedure for agencies.”2 The system 
extends to standards of judicial review, which are explicitly stated in 
section 150B-51 of Article 4 of the APA. 3 Consistent with the 
statutory goal of uniformity, the North Carolina Supreme Court has 
ruled that section 150B-51 is the default standard of judicial review 
for appeals of agency orders and decisions.4 However, numerous 
*Assistant Professor, Campbell Law School.  With gratitude to everyone 
who read drafts and commented on this project, especially Judge Julian Mann, III, 
Bobbi Jo Boyd, Margaret Currin, Charles Daye, Lisa Lukasik, Matt Sawchak, and 
Richard Whisnant, and for the research assistance of Emily Pappas, Chris Waivers 
and Julie Yates.
1 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-
Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38–39
(1994) (discussing the benefits of uniform interpretation of federal substantive 
laws); Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal 
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995) (praising the “triumph of uniformity” 
in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Tom C. Clark, Attorney 
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, FSU COLLEGE OF LAW
(1947), http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947intro.html (last visited May 31, 
2013) (citing the imposition of “relative uniformity” on the federal administrative 
machinery as one of the goals of the act); see also infra text accompanying notes 
110–115.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1 (2013).  The APA was enacted in 1973 and 
codified in Chapter 150A of the general statutes.  In 1986, sections 150A-1 through 
150A-64 were recodified as sections 150B-1 through 150B-64.  Chapter 150A. 
Administrative Procedure Act, NCGA, 
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/statutes/statutelookup.pl?statute=150A (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2013).
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43 to -52.  Unless otherwise indicated, all 
statutes referenced in the text are from North Carolina.
4 Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 S.E.2d 495, 498 (N.C. 
1981) (applying the APA in the “interest of uniformity” to appeals from city and 
county boards of education when no other statute specified a standard of review, 
even though city and county boards were exempt from the APA); State ex rel.
Utils. Comm’n v. Bird Oil, 273 S.E.2d 232, 235 n.1 (N.C. 1980); State ex rel.
Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980). But see In 
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agency-specific statutes undermine the APA’s goal of uniform 
judicial review.5 This Article argues that the legislature should revise 
such statutes, thereby standardizing, simplifying, and clarifying the 
standard of judicial review of administrative appeals.
The APA envisions a system where most appeals6 from an 
order or decision of a North Carolina agency are filed in a North 
Carolina Superior Court,7 invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the 
court.8 Any deviation from this norm must be specifically mandated 
by a statute that confers a standard of review at least “equal to” the 
one provided by the APA.9 Unfortunately, many statutes deviate 
from that norm.  There are at least seventeen agency-specific statutes 
that confer original jurisdiction in the courts over administrative 
appeals, meaning that the reviewing court has the plenary power to 
retry the case.10 There are also dozens of specific judicial review 
provisions in agency organic statutes.  While some of these statutes 
clearly confer appellate jurisdiction on the reviewing courts, many of 
them use inconsistent or unclear language.  The resulting difficulty in 
determining the correct standard of review can be confusing to judges 
and litigants alike.11
Discovering the correct standard of review is further 
complicated by the relative lack of guidance available to judges and 
practitioners.  Appeals from administrative orders comprise only a 
re McElwee, 283 S.E.2d 115, 120 (N.C. 1981) (noting that agency-specific statute 
provided the correct standard of review because it was enacted after the APA).
5 See Appendix.
6 Only a few administrative orders are appealable to courts other than the 
superior courts.  For example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviews the 
final orders of the North Carolina Utilities and Industrial Commissions and certain 
orders of the Commission of Insurance.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-250(b), 58-2-80.  
Appeals from the rulings of county game commissioners are reviewed de novo in 
the district court division.  Id. § 7A–250(c); see infra text accompanying notes 
158–161.
7 In North Carolina, the general court of justice consists of an appellate 
division, a superior court division, and a district court division.  N.C. CONST. art. 
IV, § 9 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4.
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43, 150B-51.
9 Comm’r of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150B-43.
10 See infra Part III.A.  Original jurisdiction provides for a standard of 
review that is greater in scope than appellate jurisdiction.
11 See infra Part III.B.
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fraction of the superior court docket.  From July 2011 to June 2012, 
for example, administrative appeals comprised less than 1% of the 
civil docket in the superior courts, and .1% of the total docket.12
Perhaps because of the low percentage of appeals from 
administrative cases, scholarly articles and written opinions on the 
standard of review are comparatively sparse.  Furthermore, it is 
difficult for a superior court judge, who is subject to reelection after 
an eight-year term,13 to develop expertise in this area if he rarely 
handles administrative appeals. 14 To make matters more 
complicated, the legislature in 2011 tinkered with the review 
provisions in the APA, changing the standard of review of decisions 
made by the administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH).15
This Article has two purposes, one descriptive and one 
normative.  The descriptive task is to provide an overview of the 
standards of judicial review in North Carolina, including recent 
legislative updates, to assist superior court judges and practitioners in 
understanding these standards.16 There is some urgency in educating 
12 See N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA COURTS,
STATISTICAL AND OPERATIONAL REPORT: TRIAL COURTS 3 (July 1, 2011–June 30, 
2012), available at 
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Documents/2011-12_SOR-
TrialCourts.pdf (reporting that only 130 administrative appeals were filed in 2011-
12, of the 24,345 civil cases and 290,121 total cases filed).
13 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (2013).
14 Prior to 1985 the APA vested jurisdiction over administrative appeals 
exclusively in the Wake County Superior Court.  An Act to Amend Chapter 150A 
of the General Statutes, ch. 746, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006.  The judges in Wake 
County developed a familiarity with administrative cases.  Currently, 
administrative appeals must be made to the superior court in the county where the 
petitioner resides, thereby dispersing the administrative caseload and making it 
even more difficult for superior court judges to develop expertise in the area.  N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 150B-45(a)(2) (2013).
15 See infra Part II.C.2.
16 The genesis of this Article was a paper presented by the Honorable Paul 
Ridgeway, a superior court judge in Wake County, to the North Carolina 
Conference of Superior Court Judges.  Judge Ridgeway’s presentation was 
intended to educate superior court judges, many of whom have little or no 
experience with administrative cases before they are elected to the bench, in the 
complexities of reviewing such appeals.  Paul Ridgeway, Remarks at the North 
Carolina Conference of Superior Court Judges (Oct. 19, 2011) (transcript available 
at the University of North Carolina School of Government), available at
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the North Carolina bench and bar in this area.  Now that ALJs can 
enter final orders in contested cases, agencies have the right to appeal 
unfavorable decisions to the superior court, 17 which may cause a 
significant increase in the number of cases brought to the courts and a 
corresponding need for a clear and predictable regime of judicial 
review.  As long ago as 1980, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
noted that “[t]he proliferation of appeals from state administrative 
agencies during recent years requires an orderly appellate process,” 
which necessarily entails identifying and applying the appropriate 
standard of review.18 Orderly process disappears when one court 
must “guess the scope of review provided by another and when the 
parties fail to structure their arguments on appeal according to the 
relevant standard.”19 The normative purpose of this Article is to urge 
the North Carolina General Assembly to make changes that will 
facilitate the orderly appellate process envisioned by the APA and 
desired by the supreme court.
Part II of this Article surveys and summarizes the current 
landscape of appellate and original jurisdiction over administrative 
appeals in the superior courts, including recent legislative updates, 
with the intention of providing a useful guide to judges and 
practitioners alike.  Part III of this Article proposes legislative 
updates to simplify and clarify superior court jurisdiction over 
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Ridgeway_SCJ%20Conf%20
manuscript%20formatted.pdf.
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (giving ALJs authority to make final 
decisions in contested cases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (providing right to 
judicial review for “[a]ny party or person aggrieved by the final decision in a 
contested case”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(5) (including agency in the definition 
of party).
18 State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Bird Oil Co., 273 S.E.2d 232, 235 (N.C. 
1980).
19 Id.; see also In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 409 (N.C. 
1981) (noting that “use of the correct standard clarifies the basic issues and focuses 
the reviewing court’s inquiry on the relevant factors”).  Nevertheless, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court has occasionally reviewed cases in which neither of the 
lower courts identified the standard of review they applied, or applied an 
inappropriate standard of review.  See, e.g., Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 281 
S.E.2d 24, 27–28 (N.C. 1981); N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d at 409; Bird 
Oil Co., 273 S.E.2d at 235.  The reviewing court’s application of an incorrect 
standard of review may, but does not necessarily, result in a remand.  See, e.g.,
Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 104 (N.C. 2010).
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administrative appeals.  First, the legislature should amend almost all 
of the statutes that confer original jurisdiction on the reviewing 
courts, conferring appellate jurisdiction instead.  Second, the 
legislature should consider amending the current array of agency-
specific judicial review statutes to use language that more clearly and 
simply confers APA-style appellate jurisdiction on the reviewing 
court.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF SUPERIOR COURT JURISDICTION OVER 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
There are three concepts important to understanding a 
superior court’s jurisdiction over administrative appeals: first, the 
difference between the appellate and original jurisdictions of the 
superior courts; second, the standards of review conferred by the 
APA, which govern the majority of all appeals from administrative 
decisions; and third, the exceptions to the APA’s default standards of 
review, whether minor or significant.  This section discusses each 
topic in turn.
A. The Appellate and Original Jurisdiction of the North 
Carolina Superior Courts
The superior court’s authority to hear appeals from 
administrative agencies is conferred by section 7A-250(a) of the 
General Statutes, which establishes two distinct types of jurisdiction:  
“review by original action or proceeding, or by appeal.”20 It is 
critical for the superior court to understand whether the case invokes 
its original or appellate jurisdiction, as the different types of
jurisdiction result in different scopes of review.
The superior court exercises its appellate jurisdiction over 
administrative orders in much the same way that a court of appeals 
exercises appellate jurisdiction over superior court orders.  The scope 
of appellate jurisdiction is to examine the lower tribunal’s decision 
and determine “whether the findings of fact are supported by the 
evidence, whether the findings support the conclusions of law, and 
whether the conclusions of law are a proper statement and application 
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(a) (emphasis added).
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of the law.” 21 The superior court reviews de novo the lower 
tribunal’s decision for errors of law but defers to the lower tribunal’s 
findings of fact, provided that they are “supported by competent 
evidence.”22 When exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the superior 
court may not hear new evidence and does not retry the facts.23
By contrast, the superior court exercises its original
jurisdiction over administrative orders by essentially conducting a 
new trial on both the facts and the law in the case.24 In this scenario, 
the court is empowered to “disregard the facts found in an earlier 
hearing or trial and engage in independent fact-finding.”25 To invoke 
the superior court’s original jurisdiction over an appeal from an 
administrative decision, a statute must specifically use language that 
directs the superior court to take new evidence or examine evidence 
anew. 26 The power to engage in independent fact-finding is the 
hallmark of original jurisdiction; when the superior court exercises its 
original jurisdiction, it must make its own findings of fact and cannot 
defer this task to the agency.27
21 Meza, 692 S.E.2d at 103 n.1.
22 N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 896 
(N.C. 2004) (noting that it is the “traditional function of appellate courts to review 
the decisions of lower tribunals for errors of law or procedure, . . . while generally 
deferring to the latter's ‘unchallenged superiority’ to act as finders of fact,” and if 
those facts “are supported by competent evidence, the trial court’s findings of fact 
are conclusive on appeal.” (citations omitted)).
23 See Meza, 692 S.E.2d at 103 (finding that superior court erroneously 
made de novo findings of fact while conducting a review bound by the provisions 
of the APA).  If a petitioner wishes to present additional evidence, and “the court is 
satisfied that the evidence is material to the issues, is not merely cumulative, and 
could not reasonably have been presented at the administrative hearing,” the 
superior court may remand the case to the lower tribunal “so that additional 
evidence can be taken.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-49.
24 Even when a statute confers original jurisdiction in the superior court, 
the parties must still exhaust their administrative remedies.  N.C. GEN. STAT. 150B-
43 (conferring the right to judicial review on parties who have “exhausted all 
administrative remedies” and are “aggrieved by the final decision in a contested 
case”); see also In re N.C. Pesticide Bd., File Nos. IR94–128, IR94–151, IR94–
155, 509 S.E.2d 165, 174 (N.C. 1998).
25 Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 895 n.3 (citation omitted).
26 See In re Dunn, 326 S.E.2d 309, 311–12 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (finding 
that statute did not confer power on superior court to find new facts in appeal from 
tax assessment).
27 Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 896.
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Because the standards of review in the APA are established as 
the default, appeals from agency orders to the superior court invoke 
its appellate jurisdiction, and not its original jurisdiction, unless a 
statute specifically provides otherwise.28 Most appeals from agencies 
to the superior court fall within the APA’s default rule, and therefore 
invoke only the court’s appellate jurisdiction.  However, because 
some statutes designate certain agency appeals to be within the 
superior court’s original jurisdiction, the superior court must always 
determine, by reference to statute, the scope of its jurisdiction, as 
described in the following sections.
B. The Default Rule: Appellate Jurisdiction as Determined by 
the APA
In most instances of appeals from agency decisions, the 
jurisdiction of the superior court is determined by Article 4 of the 
APA.  Within Article 4, section 150B-43 provides, in part, that: 
Any . . . person who is aggrieved by the final 
decision in a contested case,29 and who has exhausted 
all administrative remedies made available to [him] by 
statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of 
the decision under this Article, unless adequate 
procedure for judicial review is provided by another 
statute, in which case the review shall be under such 
other statute.30
While the statute specifically refers to decisions in contested 
cases, the standards of review in Article 4 also apply to agency rules 
when the agency has either denied or ruled on a request for a 
28 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43; Dunn, 326 S.E.2d at 311; see infra Part 
II.B.
29 A contested case includes “any dispute between an agency and another 
person that involves the person’s rights, duties, or privileges, including licensing or 
the levy of a monetary penalty.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-22.  The APA 
encourages all such disputes to be decided first through “informal” procedures.  Id.
If those proceedings fail to reach a resolution, either party may “commence an 
administrative proceeding,” at which time the dispute becomes a “contested case.”  
Id.
30 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (emphasis added). 
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declaratory ruling pursuant to section 150B-4 31 or has denied a 
petition for rulemaking pursuant to section 150B-20.32
Accordingly, Article 4 of the APA, which confers appellate 
jurisdiction only, is the default authority for the superior court’s 
jurisdiction in agency appeals.  The superior court’s jurisdiction over 
agency appeals is appellate unless the agency (1) is exempt from 
Article 4 of the APA, (2) is governed by a statute that specifies a 
different standard of review, or (3) is subject to the unique exception 
within Article 4.33 The next section describes in detail the appellate 
jurisdiction authorized by the APA and then briefly outlines the three 
exceptions to the default rule.
1. The Standard of Review Under the Superior Court’s 
Appellate Jurisdiction
When a superior court has jurisdiction over an agency 
decision pursuant to Article 4 of the APA, the statute authorizes two 
types of review, depending on the errors alleged by the petitioner34: a 
de novo standard of review regarding questions of law, and “whole 
record” review regarding “fact-intensive” questions.35 Whole record 
review is deferential to the agency, whereas de novo review is not. 
While the APA designates only two standards of review—one 
for questions of law and one for questions of fact—some questions 
31 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-4(a)(a1) (allowing judicial review if the 
request for a declaratory ruling is denied, has been issued, has not been denied or 
granted within thirty days, or has not issued within forty-five days); Diggs v. N.C. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 578 S.E.2d 666, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
(listing elements requiring agency to issue declaratory ruling). 
32 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-20(d) (“Denial of a rule-making petition . . . is 
subject to judicial review . . . .  Failure . . . to grant or deny a rule-making petition 
within the agency’s time limit . . . [functions as] a denial” and is subject to judicial 
review.); see, e.g., ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for Health Servs., 483 S.E.2d 
388, 391 (N.C. 1997) (finding that Commission had denied ACT-UP’s petition to 
amend its rule).
33 See N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 
896–97 (N.C. 2004).
34 ACT-UP Triangle, 483 S.E.2d at 392.
35 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 
96, 102 (N.C. 2010); N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 
888, 894 (N.C. 2004); Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, 
Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Perspective, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1571, 1592 (2001).
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are difficult to sort neatly into the categories of “law” or “fact.”  Such 
issues, which are sometimes called “mixed question of law and fact,” 
often involve the application of a broad or ambiguous statutory term 
to the facts in a particular case; 36 typical examples include the 
definitions of “negligence” or whether an injury “arises out of and in 
the course of the employment.”37 In such cases, the correct standard 
of review—deferential or not—can be determined according to 
functional considerations, such as the types of facts at issue, the 
expertise of the agency making the initial decision, and whether the 
reviewing judge believes that she is equally well situated as the 
agency to decide the matter.38 Thus, for example, if the statutory 
term to be applied is specifically defined by statute, the reviewing 
court is equally well situated as the agency to interpret the term.39
But if the issues turn on the credibility of witnesses, or rely on
36 NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (prescribing “limited” 
judicial review when “the question is one of specific application of a broad 
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must 
determine it initially ”).
37 Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 365 S.E.2d 898, 900 (N.C. 1988) 
(“Negligence is a mixed question of law and fact, and the reviewing court must 
determine whether the Commission’s findings support its conclusions.”); Ramsey 
v. S. Indus. Constructors Inc., 630 S.E.2d 681, 685 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“The 
Commission’s determination that an accident arose out of and in the course of 
employment is a mixed question of law and fact . . . .  This Court reviews the 
record to determine if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by 
the record.”).  Both of these mixed questions are decided in the first instance by the 
Industrial Commission and appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, where they 
are reviewed for “any competent evidence.”  Id. at 685.  Now that the Industrial 
Commission is subject to the APA, this standard of review may change.  See also 
Daye, supra note 35, at 1593 n.82; infra text accompanying notes 75–78.
38 For an in-depth discussion, see HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A.
ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 12–16 (2007) (discussing the 
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact); Daye, supra note 35, at 
1592–94.
39 See, e.g., Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 281 S.E.2d 24, 27–28 
(N.C. 1981) (holding that de novo review applied to the Board’s interpretation of 
the statutory term “serious,” which is specifically defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-
127(18)); In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 409 (N.C. 1981) 
(holding that de novo, not whole record, review applied to the Credit Union’s 
interpretation of the statutory term “common bond,” which is specifically defined 
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.26(b)).
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specialized or technical expertise, the reviewing court should use 
deferential (whole record) review.40
The next two sections will discuss, in turn, the de novo and 
whole record standards of review.
2. The De Novo Standard of Review
When employing the de novo standard of review, a superior 
court acts in the capacity of an appellate court and reviews the 
official record of an agency decision for errors of law.41 The superior 
court “consider[s] the matter anew[] and freely substitut[es] its own 
judgment for the agency’s judgment.”42 The court should treat the 
matter “as though the issue had not yet been determined.”43 The 
court may reverse or modify the agency’s decision if it finds that 
“substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced.”44
40 State ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 565
(N.C. 1980) (noting that, in an adjudicatory proceeding, it is for the agency, not the 
court, “to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility 
of the witnesses, to draw inferences from the facts, and to appraise conflicting and 
circumstantial evidence.”); Daye, supra note 35, at 1592–94; see, e.g., Hearst, 322 
U.S. at 130 (applying deferential review to the agency’s decision that newsboys 
were statutory employees because Congress had assigned the task of defining the 
term to the agency in charge of administering the statute).
41 N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 895 
(N.C. 2004).  The de novo standard of appellate review should not be confused 
with jurisdictional statutes that confer original jurisdiction on the superior court to 
conduct a “‘de novo’ hearing or trial.”  Id. at 896 n.3.  These jurisdictional statutes 
empower the court to consider anew the entire matter—both law and facts—as if 
there had been no proceeding below.  Id.; see infra Part III.B.
42 Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty. Planning Bd., 565 S.E.2d. 9, 17 
(N.C. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
43 Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 513 
S.E.2d 70, 74 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
44 N.C. GEN. STAT. §150B-51 (2013).  The use of the phrase “may have 
been prejudiced” requires a harmless error analysis.  Daye, supra note 35, at 1592;
see, e.g., Bulloch v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 732 S.E.2d 373, 
381–82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that errors made by the State Personnel 
Commission did not prejudice the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety 
and affirming the Commission’s reversal of the Department’s termination of 
officer).
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The APA identifies four issues of law that can be the basis of 
a petitioner’s appeal45 and therefore reviewed de novo:
Whether the agency’s decision was in violation of the 
constitution,
Whether the decision was in excess of statutory authority 
or jurisdiction,
Whether the decision was made upon unlawful procedure, 
and 
Whether the decision was affected by other error of law.46
But not all errors of law receive de novo review, despite the 
APA’s clear prescription.  The courts traditionally defer, to a limited 
extent, to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision of its 
enabling statute or a statute that it has the authority to enforce.47 The 
rationale for limited deference is based on the doctrine of separation 
of powers, which is explicitly mandated by section 6 of article I of 
the North Carolina Constitution.48 This doctrine requires the courts 
to defer to the authority of an agency authorized to exercise 
regulatory power, provided the delegation of that authority is 
constitutional. 49 The theory of deferential judicial review is that 
many agency actions, including some kinds of statutory construction, 
45 In judicial appeals subject to Article 4 of the APA, the petitioner can 
assert the six errors listed in section 150B-51(b): these four issues of law and the 
two fact-intensive issues discussed in Part II.B.2–II.B.3 of this Article.  Petitioners 
are not limited to these assertions of error, however, as section 150B-43 also 
provides that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall prevent any . . . person aggrieved 
from invoking any judicial remedy available to [him] under the law to test the 
validity of any administrative action not made reviewable under this Article.”
46 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b).
47 In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (N.C. 1981).
48 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The legislative, executive, and supreme 
judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from 
each other.”).
49 Jones v. Keller, 698 S.E.2d 49, 54 (N.C. 2010); State ex rel. Comm’r of 
Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 563 (N.C. 1980) (noting that “we must 
expect the Legislature to legislate only so far as is reasonable and practical to do 
and we must leave to executive officers the authority to accomplish the legislative 
purpose, guided of course by proper standards”); Adams v. N.C. Dep’t of Natural 
& Econ. Res., 249 S.E.2d 402, 406 (N.C. 1978), (noting that “[a] modern 
legislature must be able to delegate in proper instances ‘a limited portion of its 
legislative powers’ to administrative bodies which are equipped to adapt legislation 
‘to complex conditions involving numerous details with which the Legislature 
cannot deal directly.’”).
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require expertise that the courts do not possess, and further, involve 
policy choices more appropriately made by the politically 
accountable branches of the government.50
Compared to the federal courts, North Carolina engages in a 
more limited form of deference.  For example, despite its 
longstanding tradition of deference, 51 North Carolina has never 
adopted the highly deferential standard of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.52 Instead, in In re North 
Carolina Savings & Loan League, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
explicitly relied on an older federal case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,53
to describe the moderate degree to which it defers to an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term.54 Under Skidmore, a 
reviewing court accepts an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term 
50 See Gill v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Wake Cnty., 76 S.E. 203, 208 (N.C. 
1912) (opining that “[i]f any such radical change in our governmental policy is to 
be made, it should originate in the Legislature, acting within its legislative sphere, 
and not in this court.  It is inconceivable that a consistent and persistent 
construction given to similar statutes by the superintendent of public instruction 
and his legal adviser, the Attorney General, for so long a time, should have escaped 
the attention of the Legislature, and its silence may safely be construed as an assent 
to their interpretation of the word.”).  But see City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 
1863 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (questioning whether the federal executive 
agencies are politically accountable). 
51 See Gill, 76 S.E. at 208 (deferring to the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction’s interpretation of a statutory term, noting that “contemporaneous 
construction and official usage for a long period by persons charged with the 
administration of the law have always been regarded as legitimate and valuable 
aids in ascertaining the meaning of a statute”).
52 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984).  Under Chevron, a reviewing court will not disturb the agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 844.  While Chevron has been cited in 
several North Carolina Court of Appeals opinions, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court has never adopted the Chevron approach.  See, e.g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 685 S.E.2d 562, 565 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2009); Martin v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 670 S.E.2d 
629,632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); Comm’r of Labor of N.C. v. Weekley Homes, L.P.,
609 S.E.2d 407, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Teasley v. Beck, 574 S.E.2d 137, 141 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Cnty. of Durham v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., 507
S.E.2d 310, 311 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
53 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
54 In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (N.C. 1981).
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only if the court is persuaded that the interpretation is valid.55 While 
the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that courts 
“traditionally accord[] some deference” to an agency’s interpretations 
of its enabling statutes, it unequivocally stated that “those 
interpretations are not binding.”56 Rather, the weight given to the 
agency interpretation depends on “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”57 If the court finds 
the agency’s interpretation unpersuasive, it has the authority to 
substitute a meaning closer to that intended by the legislature.58
The style of deference articulated by Skidmore and In re 
Appeal of North Carolina Savings & Loan League is perhaps better 
described as another tool of statutory construction rather than 
deference.  When a statute is unambiguous, the reviewing court gives 
the term its unambiguous meaning, giving no deference to the 
agency. 59 But when a statutory term is ambiguous, “the 
interpretation of a statute given by the agency charged with carrying 
it out is entitled to great weight.”60 The agency’s interpretation joins 
other statutory tools—such as “the language of the act, the spirit of 
55 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  Skidmore prescribes a much less deferential 
approach to agency interpretations than that described in Chevron. EDWARDS &
ELLIOTT, supra note 38, at 160–61 (2007) (noting that Skidmore is less deferential 
than the analysis under Chevron Step Two); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too 
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1150-53 (2012) (describing the difference between Chevron
and Skidmore deference using the metaphors of “space” and “weight”).
56 N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d at 410 (finding unpersuasive the 
North Carolina Credit Union Commission’s interpretation of the statutory term 
“common bond”); see also Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 281 S.E.2d 24, 29 
(N.C. 1981) (considering whether the Board’s interpretation of the statutory term 
“serious” is persuasive).  
57 N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d at 410 (quoting Skidmore, 323 
U.S. at 140).
58 Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 118 S.E.2d 303, 310 (N.C. 1961).
59 See, e.g., Walker v. Bd. of Trs., 499 S.E.2d 429, 430–31 (N.C. 1998) 
(concluding that statutory term was unambiguous).
60 Frye Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 510 S.E.2d 159, 163 (N.C. 1999) 
(concluding that statute was ambiguous and concurring with the Department of 
Human Resources’s interpretation of the statutory term).
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the act and what the act seeks to accomplish” 61—in helping the court 
to determine legislative intent.  
If the standards of review in the APA could be described as a 
spectrum of deference, de novo review would occupy a position at 
one end, representing a complete lack of deference to the agency’s 
position; Skidmore and In re Appeal of North Carolina Savings & 
Loan League would occupy a position somewhat removed from that 
end, but not as deferential as whole record review, which is discussed 
in the next section.
3. The Whole Record Standard of Review
When employing the whole record standard of review, a 
superior court acts in the capacity of an appellate court and 
deferentially reviews the official record of an agency decision for 
error.  The APA identifies two fact-intensive issues that require 
deferential, whole record review:
Whether the agency decision was supported by substantial 
evidence, and 
Whether the agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion.62
The following subsections discuss each of these assertions of 
error in turn.
a. Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
If a party asserts that an agency decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence, the superior court must conduct a “whole record 
review,” 63 which means an examination of all of the competent 
61 Lee v. Gore, 717 S.E.2d 356, 358 (N.C. 2011) (describing the traditional 
tools of statutory construction).
62 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)–(c) (2013).  The “abuse of discretion” 
language was added to the statute in 2001.  Prior to that time, North Carolina courts 
had used the phrases “abuse of discretion” and “arbitrary and capricious” 
interchangeably.  See Welch v. Kearns, 134 S.E.2d 155, 156 (N.C. 1964) (defining 
review for abuse of discretion as review for evidence of “conscientious judgment, 
not arbitrary action” on the part of the decisionmaker); High Rock Lake Ass’n v. 
N.C. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm’n, 276 S.E.2d 472, 474 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) 
(concluding that omission of “abuse of discretion” from the APA did not preclude 
judicial review of discretionary agency decisions).
63 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B–51(c).
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evidence in the record to determine whether the agency decision is 
supported by substantial evidence,64 and if not, whether substantial 
rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the 
agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions were affected 
by the lack of substantial evidence.65 The whole record requirement 
specifically means that the reviewing court must take into account 
“whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the 
[agency’s] evidence” when determining the substantiality of evidence 
supporting the agency’s decision.66 In other words, as described by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. National 
Labor Relations Board, whole record review requires the superior 
court to take into account all of the evidence in the record, including 
that which supports and detracts from the agency’s findings. 67
Whole record review is deferential and presumes that agencies, not 
courts, are the superior fact-finders in administrative proceedings.68
Like the federal courts, the North Carolina courts define 
substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”69 In terms of 
quantity and quality of evidence, substantial evidence is more than a 
mere scintilla, or more than a permissible factual inference that 
64 N.C. Pesticide Bd. v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric., 509 S.E.2d 165, 170 (N.C. 
1998).
65 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)–(c).
66 Lackey v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 293 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. 1982);
Thompson v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (N.C. 1977).  
67 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).  The North 
Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly adopted the reasoning of Universal Camera.
See Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541 (quoting and citing Universal Camera for the 
meaning of the whole record test).
68 See generally KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
319–20 (2008).
69 See Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (defining 
substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion”); N.C. Pesticide Bd., 509 S.E.2d at 170; 
Walker v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 397 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); 
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(5); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Carolina 
Util. Customers Ass’n, 524 S.E.2d 10 (N.C. 2000) (quoting Consol. Edison, to 
define “substantial evidence” in the Public Utilities Act); N.C. Dep’t of Crime 
Control & Pub. Safety v. Greene, 616 S.E.2d 594, 598 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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supports the agency’s action. 70 Defined in this manner, the 
substantial evidence standard is similar to the standard of review of a 
directed verdict.  The reviewing court must determine whether there 
is enough evidence supporting the agency’s decision to refuse to 
direct a verdict against the agency, were it a question of fact to be 
tried to a jury.71
The substantial evidence test, unlike de novo review, is 
strongly deferential to the agency.  The agency’s findings of fact, if 
supported by substantial evidence, “are conclusive on appeal.”72 The 
reviewing court may not replace the agency’s judgment with its own 
“as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court 
could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been 
before it de novo.”73 In other words, the reviewing court must defer 
to the agency’s findings regarding credibility of witnesses and the 
resolution of conflicts in their testimonies.74
But the substantial evidence test is a more rigorous form of 
review than the “any competent evidence” standard, which the North 
Carolina courts used prior to the enactment of the APA.75 The “any 
competent evidence” standard is so deferential to agency fact finders 
that it requires the reviewing court to uphold the agency’s findings if 
there is even one item of competent evidence to support its findings, 
regardless of contradictory evidence in the record.76 The practical 
70 See Lackey, 293 S.E.2d at 171; Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541.  For a 
detailed discussion of the quantity and quality of evidence in an agency record, see
Daye, supra note 35, at 1601–06.
71 See In re Will of Buck, 516 S.E.2d 858, 860 (N.C. 1999) (explaining 
that appellate review of “a trial court’s rulings on motions for a directed verdict at 
the close of the evidence . . . [tests] whether substantial evidence introduced at trial 
would support a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party”); see also NLRB v. 
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939); WERHAN, supra note 
68, at 320.
72 In re Wake Kidney Clinic P.A., 355 S.E.2d 788, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1987).
73 Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 102, 105 (N.C. 2010) 
(quoting Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541).
74 State ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 565
(N.C. 1980); In re Wilkins, 242 S.E.2d 829, 841 (N.C. 1978).
75 In re Rogers, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (N.C. 1979).
76 See Frank W. Hanft, Administrative Law, 45 N.C. L. Rev. 816, 817 
(1967) (describing the “any competent evidence” standard, quoting one judge as 
saying “if one discredited witness said the cat was black, and 10 unimpeached 
Fall 2013 Simplifying the Standard of Review 603
effect of the “any competent evidence” standard is that the agency’s 
findings of fact are conclusive and binding, and rarely, if ever, 
overturned by the reviewing court. 77 In contrast, while it is a 
deferential standard, there are many examples of a reviewing court 
overturning an agency’s order using whole record review.78
Since the passage of the APA, the substantial evidence test 
and whole record review have almost completely replaced the “any 
competent evidence” test and are favored by the North Carolina 
Supreme Court in the absence of a clear statutory directive to the 
contrary. 79 However, the “any competent evidence” standard is 
specified by statute for the decisions of the Board of Medical 
Examiners, 80 the Industrial Commission, 81 and the Division of 
witnesses declared it to be white, there was substantial evidence to support a 
finding by the agency that the cat was black”).
77 Petree v. Duke Power Co., 150 S.E.2d 749, 750 (N.C. 1966) (applying 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (2013), the standard of review mandated by statute for the 
Industrial Commission).
78 See, e.g., Lackey v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 293 S.E.2d 171, 178 
(N.C. 1982) (overturning judgment for the Department of Human Resources, 
finding that report of non-examining physician, standing alone, was not substantial 
evidence to support a denial of Medicaid disability benefits); State ex rel. Comm’r 
of Ins. v. N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888–91 (N.C. 1977) 
(reversing the Commissioner’s disapproval of the filing of the Rating Bureau 
because the order was “supported only by conclusory findings of fact which, in 
turn, are unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the entire 
record”); Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541–44 (overturning Wake County School 
Board, finding that dismissal of career teacher on grounds of immorality, 
insubordination, and mental incapacity was not supported by substantial evidence 
on the entire record); Underwood v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 181 S.E.2d 1, 7 
(N.C. 1971) (overturning State Board of Alcoholic Control, finding that suspension 
of license was not supported by substantial evidence); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 150 S.E.2d 386, 389–91 (N.C. 1966) (overturning 
Utilities Commission, finding that rejection of railroad’s application to reduce 
agent hours was not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in 
the record, and was therefore arbitrary and capricious).
79 In re Rogers, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (N.C. 1979) (noting that “with few 
exceptions judicial review of administrative decisions in North Carolina is under 
the ‘whole record’ test,” and that the policy of the APA and other statutes favor the 
whole record test of judicial review).
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.1 (2013) (when reviewing the Medical 
Board’s decision denying issuance of a license, the decision of the Board shall be 
upheld unless it is “not supported by any evidence admissible under this Article”); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.10 (when reviewing the Medical Board’s decision taking 
disciplinary action on a license, the court may reverse the Board if its decision is 
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Employment Security82—agencies that were completely exempt from 
the APA until January 1, 2012.83 Now that all three of these agencies 
are subject to the APA, it is not clear whether the “any competent 
evidence” review provisions in their organic statutes continue to be 
valid, to the extent that they conflict with the APA or provide for a 
standard of review that is not equivalent to whole record review.84
“not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence admissible under 
this Article”); In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 838 (N.C. 1989) (ruling that “[j]udicial 
review of a decision by the Board of Medical Examiners is made according to what 
is frequently referred to as the ‘any competent evidence’ standard”); In re Rogers,
253 S.E.2d at 922 n.4 (noting the same).
81 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (on review, the orders of the Industrial 
Commission “shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact; but either 
party to the dispute may . . . appeal from the decision of said Commission to the 
Court of Appeals for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern 
appeals from the superior court to the Court of Appeals in ordinary civil actions”) 
(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court interprets this statute to require “any 
competent evidence” review of the Commission’s findings of fact.  Deese v. 
Champion Int’l Corp., 530 S.E.2d 549, 552 (N.C. 2000); Adams v. AVX Corp.,
509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (N.C. 1998).  Appeals from the Industrial Commission are 
made directly to the Court of Appeals.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(b).  
82 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-15(i) (on review, the “finding of facts by the 
Commission, if there is any competent evidence to support them and in the absence 
of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to 
questions of law”) (emphasis added); see Edgecombe Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. 
Hickman, 712 S.E.2d 209, 211 (N.C. 2011); Binney v. Banner Therapy Prods. Inc., 
661 S.E.2d 717, 720 (N.C. 2008).
83 The original APA listed all three of these agencies as completely 
exempt.  Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 1331, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 692. All 
three agencies predated the enactment of the APA, which likely explains why their 
organic statutes specify a standard of review inconsistent with the APA.  The 
Medical Board was created in 1859; the Industrial Commission was created in 
1929; and the Division of Employment Security, formerly called the Employment 
Security Commission, was created in 1935.  
84 See Hanft, supra note 76, at 818–19 (suggesting that the “any competent 
evidence” standard is invalid for failure to provide adequate judicial review); State 
ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980) 
(holding that “adequate procedure for judicial review . . . exists only if the scope of 
review is equal to that under present Article 4 of G.S. Chapter 150[B]”).  
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b. Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion
If a party asserts that an agency action is “arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion,”85 the superior court must also 
conduct whole record review. 86 Agency action is arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion if it fails to reflect reasoned 
decision-making, is whimsical, patently in bad faith, or manifestly 
unfair.87 This category reflects the basic due process notion that 
government decisions must, at a minimum, be rational.  It functions 
as a “catchall” category of error that overlaps with the substantial 
evidence category,88 and, because the two fact-intensive assertions of 
error are not easily distinguishable, they are frequently made in 
tandem.89
The assertion that agency action is arbitrary and capricious is 
also made in cases that are not well suited to review for substantial 
evidence on the record because the agency’s action has not produced 
a record for review.  Thus, for example, agencies sometimes make 
decisions but are not statutorily required to hold a hearing or make 
formal record findings.  Without a record, it is impossible for a court 
to look for substantial evidence that supports the agency’s decision, 
but it is still possible to determine whether the decision was arbitrary 
or capricious. 90 Similarly, if a decision is committed to agency 
discretion, there may be no evidentiary record for the reviewing court 
85 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(6).
86 Daye, supra note 35, at 1606–07.
87 In re Parkdale Mills, 741 S.E.2d 416, 419 (N.C. 2013); Comm’r of Ins. 
v. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d at 573 (N.C. 1980); Lewis v. N.C. Dep’t of Human 
Res., 375 S.E.2d 712, 714 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
88 Daye, supra note 35, at 1606–07 (noting that any agency decision not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record is, by definition, also arbitrary and 
capricious). 
89 E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res.,
560 S.E.2d 163, 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Joyce v. Winston-Salem Univ., 370 
S.E.2d 866, 868 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); see also EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 38,
at 182–83 (discussing subtle ways in which the differences between the two 
standards of review are “not great,” but “more than merely semantic”).
90 See, e.g., Lewis, 375 S.E.2d at 715 (finding that agency was not 
arbitrary and capricious in denying grievance petition as untimely filed when 
petition was submitted one day after deadline); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 560 
S.E.2d at 170 (finding arbitrary and capricious agency denial of certification 
application when agency did not inspect facility).
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to examine, but the court reviews the decision to ensure that the 
agency exercised its discretion “in good faith and in accordance with 
law.”91
The assertion that agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion can also arise in cases involving formal hearings, 
and even when an agency’s order is supported by substantial 
evidence.  In State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North 
Carolina Rate Bureau, for example, the North Carolina Insurance 
Commissioner issued an order, following a hearing on a rate filing, 
that insurance companies must submit audited data to the 
Commission because unaudited data was not credible.92 The North 
Carolina Supreme Court found that the Commissioner’s order was 
supported by substantial evidence—uncontested expert testimony at 
the hearing—but, nevertheless, was arbitrary and capricious because 
it was “grossly imprecise in attempting to enunciate a substantive 
rule involving sweeping ramifications.”93 In other words, the court 
corrected the agency for improperly announcing an important rule 
without providing guidance as to the meaning of the rule.
C. Three Exceptions to the Default Rule of Appellate Jurisdiction
As previously explained, Article 4 of the APA is intended to 
provide a uniform system for the review of cases appealed from 
agencies, whereby most appeals from an agency order invoke the 
appellate jurisdiction of the reviewing court and the standards of 
review described in section 150B-51.  However, a number of 
exemptions from the APA disrupt the uniformity contemplated by the 
statute.  The exemptions occur in three places: in agencies entirely 
exempt from the APA; in actions governed by the pre-2012 version 
of section 150B-51(c); and most significantly, in the complex tangle 
of agency-specific statutes that confer standards of review. The 
following subsections will discuss these topics in turn.
91 ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for Health Servs., 483 S.E.2d 388, 393 
(N.C. 1997).
92 Comm’r of Ins., 269 S.E.2d at 558–59.
93 Id. at 573.
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1. Agencies Exempt from the APA
A very small number of agencies are entirely exempt from the 
APA, including the provisions regarding judicial review. 94 A
superior court must consult the specific jurisdictional statutes for 
exempt agencies to determine the appropriate standard of review.   
The largest agency that remains entirely exempt from the 
APA is the Utilities Commission. 95 Appeals from the Utilities 
Commission must be made directly to the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals, invoking its appellate jurisdiction. 96 This particular 
exemption does not especially threaten the uniformity of the review 
scheme contemplated by the APA, as the judicial review provisions 
in the Utility Commission’s organic statute are essentially identical to 
the standards of review in section 150B-51. 97 Thus, in practice, the 
existence of a few APA-exempt agencies does not significantly 
change the default rule that the reviewing court has appellate 
jurisdiction over agency appeals.
94 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(c) (2013) (exempting fully from the 
APA (1) the North Carolina National Guard in exercising its court-martial 
jurisdiction; (2) the Department of Health and Human Services in 
exercising its authority over the Camp Butner reservation granted in 
Article 6 of Chapter 122C of the General Statutes; (3) the Utilities 
Commission; (4) the State Board of Elections in administering the HAVA 
Administrative Complaint Procedure of Article 8A of Chapter 163 of the 
General Statutes; and (5) the North Carolina State Lottery).
95 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(c). The legislature made the Industrial 
Commission and the Division of Employment Security subject to the APA as of 
January 1, 2012. Protecting and Putting North Carolina Back to Work Act, 2011 
N.C. Sess. Laws 1087, 1101; An Act to Reform the Employment Security Laws of 
North Carolina, 2011 N.C Sess. Laws 1717, 1721.
96 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(b).
97 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62–94; State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Bird Oil 
Co., 273 S.E.2d 232, 235 n.1 (N.C. 1980) (noting the “slight variation in wording” 
between the review provisions in section 62–94 and the APA, and concluding that 
the legislature intended for “judicial review of orders of the Utilities Commission 
and other state agencies covered by the Administrative Procedure Act to be 
essentially the same”); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Public Staff-N.C. Utils. 
Comm’n, 472 S.E.2d 193, 195–96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that “[w]here the
Commission’s actions do not violate the Constitution or exceed statutory authority, 
appellate review is limited to errors of law, arbitrary action, or decisions 
unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence”) (quoting State ex 
rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Springdale Estates Ass’n, 265 S.E.2d 647, 651 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1980)).
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2. Appeals from Final Agency Decisions Where the Agency Has 
Not Adopted an Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended 
Decision
The second minor exception to the default rule of appellate 
jurisdiction is found in section 150B-51(c) of the APA, as it existed 
prior to 2012;98 as a practical matter, this exemption will soon cease 
to exist.  Previously, section 150B-51(c) required the superior court 
to exercise a limited form of original jurisdiction over contested 
cases, but only if the case had previously been heard in the OAH and 
the agency did not adopt the ALJ’s recommended decision.99 In this 
event, the superior court would “review the official record, de novo, 
and . . . make findings of fact and conclusions of law,” giving no 
deference to “to any prior decision made in the case,” including “the 
findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the agency's 
final decision.”100 Despite the wording, the statute did not confer 
original jurisdiction on the superior court because it did not authorize 
the reviewing court to take new evidence; rather, the reviewing court 
was authorized to determine whether the petitioner was entitled to 
relief “based upon its review of the official record.”101 In other 
words, when a case presented itself in this particular procedural 
posture, the APA conferred a hybrid form of jurisdiction on the 
superior court.  This hybrid form was part de novo, in the sense that 
the court considered the findings of law and fact anew and was 
permitted to make its own findings of fact even when neither party 
98 See 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 190.
99 Some, but not all, of the agencies subject to the APA are required by 
section 150B-23 to conduct contested case hearings before the OAH.  N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150B-23.  Prior to January 1, 2012, the OAH would issue a recommended 
decision, where the agency could adopt all, none, or any part of it. See S. Res. 781 
§ 18, Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-
34) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36 (amended 2011).  Other agencies conduct their 
own hearings of contested cases, pursuant to the rules in Article 3A of the APA.  
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-38(a) (2013) (listing agencies subject to Article 3A). 
100 S. Res. 781 § 27 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c)).
101 Id.; Brad Miller, What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 
2000 Amendments to the North Carolina APA, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1665 (2011) 
(indicating that the superior court’s de novo review of the facts is based on the 
official record); Daye, supra note 35, at 1607–10.
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objected to them,102 but also limited, in the sense that the court was 
confined to the facts presented in the administrative record and could 
not take new evidence.103 The purpose of this legislation was to put 
the aggrieved party and the agency on a more equal footing and to 
enhance the stature of ALJs and the OAH by giving a broader scope 
of judicial review to agency decisions that rejected an ALJ’s 
decision.104
In 2011, the legislature amended the APA, making the ALJ’s 
decision a “final decision” rather than a “recommended decision.”105
In the new statute, the agency is no longer empowered to adopt “all, 
none, or part” of the ALJ’s decision.106 Instead, the agency can 
petition the superior court for judicial review if it disagrees with the 
ALJ’s order.107 These amendments took effect on January 1, 2012, 
and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date.108
Thus the exception in former section 150B-51(c) will soon be moot, 
once the appeals of all matters commenced prior to the effective date 
of the amendment are concluded.
102 Cape Med. Trans., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 590 
S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
103 See Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 101 (N.C. 2010) 
(opining that under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(c), when the agency rejects the 
administrative law judge’s recommendation, “the superior court is mandated to 
make findings of fact de novo, albeit on the official administrative record as
opposed to taking new testimony”).
104 Judge Julian Mann, III, Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a 
Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2001); Daye, supra note 35, at 
1577–78; Miller, supra note 101, at 1658.
105 Regulatory Reform Act of 2011 § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1678, 
1686–87 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34–Decision of ALJ).
106 Id.
107 Regulatory Reform Act of 2011 § 22, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1687 
(amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43–Right to Judicial Review); § 15, 2011 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 1685 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(5)–definition of “Party”). 
108 A “contested case” begins when either the agency or the individual 
begins an administrative proceeding to determine that person’s “rights, duties, or 
privileges.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-22.  The case is commenced when the 
petitioner pays the fee and the petition with the OAH and the fee paid.  N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150B-23.
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3. Agencies with Agency-Specific Judicial Review Statutes
The final category of exceptions to the default rule of 
appellate jurisdiction is found in the dozens of agency-specific 
statutes providing for judicial review.109 When one of these agency-
specific statutes governs an appeal, the superior court must examine 
the statute to determine whether it requires the superior court’s 
jurisdiction to be original or appellate.  And even when the 
jurisdiction conferred is appellate, it can sometimes be difficult to 
determine whether the statutory language is meant to confer APA 
style jurisdiction or something slightly different—there is little 
consistency in the language used in these judicial review provisions 
and some downright confusing locutions.  Part III of this Article will
highlight some of the problems raised by the statutes that specifically 
confer jurisdiction over administrative appeals and will suggest 
legislative changes to simplify, clarify, and standardize the 
jurisdiction these agency-specific statutes confer.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLIFYING, CLARIFYING, AND 
STANDARDIZING AGENCY-SPECIFIC STATUTES PROVIDING FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW
It bears repeating that one of the express purposes of the 
North Carolina APA is to create “a uniform system” of state 
administrative action, including the judicial review of administrative 
action.110 Uniformity is so commonly accepted as a positive value in 
a procedural system that its benefits tend to be assumed without 
analysis.111 While uniformity should not be treated as an end unto 
109 See Appendix.
110 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1-52 (emphasis added); Empire Power Co. v. 
N.C.  Dep’t of Env’t, Health & Natural Res., 447 S.E.2d 768, 778 (N.C. 1994) 
(noting the goal of uniformity in the APA).  Despite encoding this goal of 
uniformity in the APA, the legislature has inconsistently pursued it.  For example, 
the legislature has granted certain agencies, generally covered by the APA, 
exemptions from APA rulemaking requirements.  RICHARD B. WHISNANT,
RULEMAKING IN NORTH CAROLINA 3 (2005).
111But see Marin Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity 
and Case Management in the Circuit Courts of Appeals, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 377–83
(2011) (arguing that some disuniformity in case management in the federal courts 
of appeals is justifiable); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV.
1567, 1570–72 (2008) (questioning whether uniformity in the interpretation of 
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itself, the values of having uniform standards of review are 
particularly compelling in North Carolina.  First, uniform standards 
of review streamline the decision-making process for a superior court 
judge, who can quickly master the standards of review in the APA 
and can then be confident that these standards apply in all future 
agency appeals.  Second, uniform standards of review efficiently 
allocate resources between judicial and administrative decision 
makers. 112 These efficiencies are especially important when the
reviewing judges are elected officials who carry large caseloads 
dominated by civil and criminal trials,113 have no law clerks, and may 
be unfamiliar with administrative law from any work before judicial 
service.  Third, by standardizing the applicable law, uniform 
standards of review help to avoid errors in the superior court that 
result in protracted appeals and further litigation.114 Finally, uniform 
standards of review generally bolster systemic values such as 
rationality, predictability, coherence, and legitimacy. 115 Litigants 
will not be left wondering why one petitioner received appellate 
review in the superior court while another obtained a trial de novo.
The benefits of the uniformity envisioned by the APA are 
currently undermined by the confusing array of agency-specific 
judicial review statutes, some of which confer original jurisdiction—
or an exotic hybrid jurisdiction—on the superior courts, and some of 
substantive federal rules is always preferable); Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, 
Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
39–53 (1999) (arguing that the federal courts should “accept a certain amount of 
diversity in cooperative federalism programs).
112 See Daye, supra note 35, at 1577 (noting that the goal of judicial 
review is to achieve a “workable and adequate system of external constraint on 
agency decisions through judicial oversight when citizens aggrieved by those 
decisions seek review”); see also text accompanying notes 127–132.
113 N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT 10 (July 1, 2011–June 30, 2012), available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/Publications/Documents/2011-
12_AnnualReport_20130328.pdf.
114 See infra text accompanying notes 141–154, 165–166.
115 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999) (in the federal 
context, “recognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial 
review of administrative action” when the federal APA “was meant to bring 
uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity”); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling 
the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 600 (2011) (noting that 
inconsistent application of standards of review creates unwelcome doctrinal 
confusion for agencies, plaintiffs, and regulated industries).
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which confer appellate jurisdiction but do so in confusing, 
idiosyncratic, or anachronistic (pre-APA) terms. 116 This section 
develops a framework for analyzing whether these statutory 
departures from the norm of appellate jurisdiction are justified.  It 
then reviews the seventeen statutes that vest original or hybrid 
jurisdiction over administrative appeals in the superior court; this 
section recommends legislative revisions for all but two of them.  In 
addition, this section urges the legislature to revise the numerous 
agency-specific statutes that confer appellate jurisdiction in a way 
that will clarify and conform their jurisdiction-conferring language.
A. More Procedure than is Due?  Agency-Specific Review 
Statutes Conferring Original or Hybrid Jurisdiction in the Superior 
Courts
The agency-specific review statutes that differ most 
significantly from the APA are the seventeen statutes that vest 
original or hybrid jurisdiction in the superior courts.  This section 
develops a framework for analyzing whether these statutes provide 
more procedure than is due for parties appealing an agency order.
Presumably, the statutes that confer original or hybrid 
jurisdiction were crafted with the laudable goal of providing 
aggrieved parties with adequate procedural protections, in the form of 
a new trial (or, in the case of hybrid jurisdiction, something very 
close to a new trial) in the superior court.  Thus, a legislative revision 
that removes procedural protections from litigants raises due process 
concerns, and before recommending such a revision it is important to 
consider whether the extraordinary 117 procedural protections 
116 Charles E. Daye, North Carolina’s New Administrative Procedure Act: 
An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 833, 899 (1974–1975) (arguing that the 
variety of judicial review statutes threatens the APA’s goal of uniformity); Hanft, 
supra note 76, at 819 (noting that North Carolina statutes contain a “needless 
variety” of judicial review statutes).
117 The North Carolina Supreme Court has already approved of the 
appellate standards of review in the APA, and thus appellate review is a 
constitutionally adequate baseline for most appeals from agency cases.  See State 
ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980) 
(holding that “‘adequate procedure for judicial review,’ as those words appear in 
present G.S. 150A-43, exists only if the scope of review is equal to that under 
present Article 4 of G.S. Chapter 150A”).  Because appellate review of 
administrative action is the statutory default, any upward deviation from that 
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conferred by these statutes are warranted by the circumstances they 
address.  This analysis implicates numerous procedural values that 
must be balanced, including the interests of the individual—e.g., the 
magnitude of the individual interest at stake in the proceeding—and 
the more systemic interests described previously—e.g., the public 
interests in streamlining the review process and in avoiding the 
unnecessary burdens on judicial resources caused by an inappropriate 
allocation of authority between agencies and reviewing courts.118 A
general framework for weighing these competing interests can be 
derived from the seminal case on procedural due process, Matthews 
v. Eldridge, which measures “how much procedure is due” by 
weighing three factors in what essentially amounts to a cost-benefit 
analysis: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.119
norm—i.e., original or hybrid jurisdiction—is presumably justified only by unusual 
circumstances.  
118 Daye, supra note 116, at 845.
119 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).  The Law of the 
Land Clause of Article I, § 19 of the North Carolina constitution, provides that “no 
person shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the 
land,” and “is synonymous with the fourteenth amendment due process clause of 
the federal Constitution.” McNeill v. Harnett Cnty., 398 S.E.2d 475, 563 (N.C. 
1990); In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 308 (N.C. 1976).  The United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment are “highly persuasive” in 
construing the Law of the Land Clause.  Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., 206
S.E.2d 141, 146 (N.C. 1974).  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to 
construct a constitutional argument for each statute, the method of analysis for 
determining whether procedures are consistent with the federal and state 
constitutions is a useful heuristic for determining whether the current and proposed 
statutory schemes satisfy the goals of due process.
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In other words, when determining “how much procedure is due,” the 
critical inquiry is whether the value to the individual of additional 
procedures justifies the cost—in terms of money and other systemic 
burdens—of providing those procedures. 120 The framework 
suggested by Matthews is thus to determine whether there are 
unusual circumstances, such as a particularly strong individual 
interest at stake, that justify the imposition of extraordinary 
procedural protections such as original jurisdiction in judicial review 
proceedings in the superior courts.
While it is impossible to evaluate the Matthews factors in the 
abstract, a few general observations guide the inquiry.  First, the 
amount of procedure due varies with the significance of the 
individual interest at stake.  Thus, litigants in an administrative 
proceeding who are at risk of being deprived of a significant 
benefit—e.g., a loss of welfare benefits (which are subsistence 
benefits for the most destitute) or the loss of the right to attend school 
because of a long-term school suspension—are entitled to more 
procedural protections than those whose deprivation is less 
significant—e.g., a loss of disability benefits (which are awarded 
without consideration of economic need) or a shorter-term loss of the 
right to attend school.121
Second, it is important to consider whether the additional 
procedure at issue—original jurisdiction in the superior court—adds 
significantly to the likelihood of achieving an accurate result or 
avoiding an inaccurate one.  Presumably, the value to the litigants of
a new trial in superior court comes from the more formal procedures 
that govern litigation in that forum.  When parties appealing from an 
administrative order encounter original jurisdiction in the superior 
court, they have access to the same array of information-gathering 
120 The North Carolina Court of Appeals has applied the balancing test 
from Matthews v. Eldridge in cases examining the due process rights of litigants in 
state administrative actions.  See, e.g., Nolan v. Town of Weddington, 578 S.E.2d 
710, 2003 WL 1873514, at *4 (N.C. App. Apr. 15, 2003).
121 See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 340–42 (comparing the different interests at 
stake in eligibility hearings for disability benefits and welfare benefits); Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (noting that “termination of aid pending 
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the 
very means by which to live while he waits”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575–
76 (1975) (discussing school suspensions, and noting that the weight and the nature 
of the interest at stake is relevant to the due process inquiry).
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and truth-enforcing procedures that are available to any civil litigant.  
These procedures—rights to discover information, depose witnesses, 
exclude hearsay, and cross-examine witnesses in open court (to name 
a few)—are designed to maximize truth-seeking and are of greatest 
value in cases that involve complex, disputed facts or where witness 
credibility is a crucial issue.  
These truth-seeking procedures may be of great value to a 
petitioner for judicial review when the underlying administrative 
procedure has not involved a contested case.  In contrast, it is 
unlikely that parties who have already litigated a contested case in 
the OAH need an additional trial in superior court.  After all, 
contested cases provide almost all of the same truth-seeking 
procedures to litigants, albeit in a less formal hearing.122 Further, 
elaborate truth-seeking procedures may be unnecessary in many 
administrative disputes, especially ones that involve objective or 
undisputed facts and non-discretionary determinations.123 Thus, for 
example, if the Currituck Game Commission denies a duck blind 
license to an applicant whose application is incomplete, the 
disappointed applicant likely does not need a full trial in superior 
court to resolve the dispute.124 Indeed, many far more significant 
agency decisions, involving complex and disputed facts and weighty 
interests at stake, are reviewed by superior courts in their appellate 
mode after a contested case.125
Third, it is important to consider the costs of the additional 
procedural safeguard of a trial de novo in the superior court.  These 
costs come in many forms, one of which is complexity.  By departing 
from the uniform system of review contemplated by the APA, the 
statutes risk confusing litigants and judges as to the correct standard 
of review, resulting in protracted litigation.126 Another cost comes 
122 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-23 to 150B-37 (2013)
(procedures in contested cases).
123 See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 343–44 (noting that disability termination 
decisions were based on “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by 
physician specialists” of patients whom they had actually examined and therefore 
did not merit a contested evidentiary hearing).
124 See infra text accompanying note 157–161.
125 For example, the superior courts give appellate review to the denial of 
an air quality permit.  Parties first challenge the denial of permits in a contested 
case before an Administrative Law Judge.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §143-215.108(e).
126 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 141–168, 165–166.
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from the more formal and protracted nature of superior court 
proceedings, where the state will need to defend the agency.  Original 
jurisdiction also builds redundancy into the system.  A trial de novo
means that the superior court judge must repeat the fact-finding of 
the lower tribunal, instead of simply reviewing the record for error.  
Unless the dispute has a highly contested factual record, or involves 
exceptionally important individual interests, it is difficult to believe 
that such costs are justified by the possibility of achieving a more 
accurate result.
Using superior court judges to retry administrative cases also 
represents a misallocation of resources between the judicial and 
executive branches of government.  First, it makes the administrative 
decisionmaker superfluous. 127 Second, it replaces the arguably 
superior decisionmaker—an expert agency—with an arguably 
inferior one—a generalist judge who may have little knowledge or 
understanding of the particular statutory scheme at issue.128
By contrast, vesting appellate jurisdiction in the superior 
courts has the beneficial effects of recognizing that agencies are in a 
superior position as fact finders and decisionmakers in the 
administrative process, capturing the efficiencies of administrative 
adjudication, and avoiding the negative incentives of treating the 
agency as a “pass through.”  Further, appellate jurisdiction 
appropriately constrains the judicial branch from unduly interfering 
with the administrative process.129 Thus, for example, even when the 
granting of a license relies on some non-objective factors—such as 
the requirement for “good moral character” to obtain a license to 
practice medicine 130 —the denial of such a license might 
appropriately be given appellate review in the superior court because 
the expert administrators on the Medical Board (most of whom are 
127 See N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 896 
(N.C. 2004) (noting that the superior court’s de novo review of the agency’s fact 
finding has the potential to “render an administrative agency’s statutory 
responsibility to find facts in contested cases a pointless formality”).
128 See id. (noting the “institutional advantage” of the ALJ as fact finder). 
129 See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES KOCH, JR., 33 FED.
PRAC. & PROC. JUDICIAL REVIEW §§ 8330, 8332 (1st ed. 2013); McKart v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1969) (noting that the exhaustion requirement 
similarly supports judicial economy and agency autonomy).
130 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-9.1(a)(3).
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doctors or involved in the medical profession 131 ) are in a better 
position than the superior court to find facts and make informed 
decisions about the type of character needed to practice medicine.132
Finally, it is important to remember that the superior court, 
even when acting in its appellate capacity, wields considerable 
authority to review and correct the lower tribunal’s decision.  The 
superior court is empowered to remand to the agency for 
reconsideration any arbitrary or factually unsupported decisions, or to 
order an appropriate result without remanding.133
The following subsections will analyze each of the statutes 
that confer original or hybrid jurisdiction on the superior courts in 
light of the framework and considerations suggested by Matthews v. 
Eldridge.  They conclude that, in almost every instance, the statutes 
vesting original jurisdiction in the superior courts confer more
procedural protections than the circumstances require or that are cost 
justified. 
1. Revision Recommended
a. Statutes Enacted Prior to the APA
Several statutes conferring original jurisdiction in the superior 
courts appear to have survived the enactment of the APA through 
oversight.  For example, section 90-210.94, which predates the APA, 
provides that appeals from a decision of the Board of Funeral 
Services revoking or suspending the license of a mutual burial 
association are reviewed de novo in the superior court.134 Currently, 
however, the Board of Funeral Services has the power to conduct 
hearings in accordance with the APA135 and can only suspend or 
131 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2(a).
132 See In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 837–38 (N.C. 1989) (acknowledging 
the expertise of the Board of Medical Examiners).
133 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (authorizing the court to affirm, 
remand, reverse or modify the agency order).
134 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.94 (“[T]he clerk of superior court shall 
place the matter upon the civil issue docket of the superior court and the same shall 
be heard de novo.”).
135 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.23(d1) (“The Board is empowered to hold 
hearings in accordance with the provisions of this Article and of Chapter 150B to 
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revoke a license after a hearing.136 While there may have been a 
good reason to give the licensee a new trial in the superior court at 
the time the statute was enacted, those reasons should probably be 
revisited in light of the APA.  
In addition to section 90-210.94, the pre-APA statutes 
conferring original jurisdiction on the reviewing court include:
Section 7A-250(c) 137 —“Appeals from rulings of 
county game commissions” (enacted in 1965); 
Section 20-25 138 —appeals from a discretionary 
revocation of a driver’s license (enacted in 1935); 
Section 20-279.2139—appeals from the orders of the 
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles enforcing the Motor 
Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 
1953; and
Sections 90-14.1 and 90-14.10 140 —appeals from 
decisions of the North Carolina Medical Board 
subpoena witnesses and to administer oaths to or receive the affirmation of 
witnesses before the Board.”).
136 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.86.
137 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(c) (“Appeals from rulings of county game 
commissions shall be heard in the district court division.  The appeal shall be heard 
de novo before a district court judge sitting in the county in which the game 
commission whose ruling is being appealed is located.”); see infra Part III.A.1.c.
138 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-25 (“Any person denied a license or whose 
license has been canceled, suspended or revoked by the Division, except where 
such cancellation is mandatory under the provisions of this Article, shall have a 
right to file a petition . . . for a hearing in the matter in the superior court of the 
county wherein such person shall reside . . . and such court or judge is hereby 
vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its or his duty . . . to take testimony and 
examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the petitioner is 
entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of license 
under the provisions of this Article.”); Cole v. Faulkner, 573 S.E.2d 614, 616 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re Wright, 45 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1947)) (finding that “a 
right to de novo review in superior court exists where there is a discretionary
denial, cancellation, suspension, or revocation of a driver’s license by the DMV.”); 
see infra Part III.A.1.d.
139 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b); see also infra Part III.A.1.d.
140 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.1 (“Upon appeal the case shall be heard by 
the judge without a jury, upon the record, except that in cases of alleged omissions 
or errors in the record, testimony may be taken by the court.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
90-14.10 (“Upon the review of the Board’s decision taking disciplinary action on a 
license, the case shall be heard by the judge without a jury, upon the record, except 
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(enacted in 1953) (conferring a hybrid form of original 
and appellate jurisdiction).
At a minimum, the legislature should review these statutes 
and consider revising them to conform to the review provisions of the 
APA, conferring appellate jurisdiction in the superior court.  All of 
these statutes are discussed in more detail in the following 
subsections.
b. Statutes Conferring Hybrid Original/Appellate Jurisdiction 
In addition to the statutes conferring original jurisdiction, the 
legislature has also experimented with hybrid review provisions that 
introduce further complication into the jurisdictional question.  Three 
agency-specific statutes confer either original or appellate 
jurisdiction on the superior court:
Section 108A-79(k) 141 —appeals from benefits 
determinations made by the Department of Health and 
Human Services, and 
Sections 90-14.1 and 90-14.10 142 —appeals from 
licensing and disciplinary decisions of the North 
Carolina Medical Board.
The standard of review in these statutes is problematic for 
several reasons.  First, the statutes require a complex and unusual
form of review, and anomalous legislation of this sort creates the 
potential for judicial error and protracted litigation.  Section 108A-
79(k) provides that the hearing in the superior court 
that in cases of alleged omissions or errors in the record, testimony thereon may be 
taken by the court.”); see infra Part III.A.1.b.
141 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(k).
142 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-14.1, 90-14.10; see supra note 140 and 
accompanying text.  
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shall be conducted according to the provisions of 
Article 4, Chapter 150B . . . .  The court shall, on 
request, examine the evidence excluded at the hearing 
. . . and if the evidence was improperly excluded, the 
court shall consider it.  Notwithstanding the foregoing 
provisions, the court may take testimony and examine 
into the facts of the case, including excluded 
evidence, to determine whether the final decision is in 
error . . . .143
As the North Carolina Supreme Court noted in Meza v. Division of 
Social Services, however, a comparison of the standards of review in
section 150B-51(b) and section 108A-79(k) shows that they are 
plainly inconsistent. 144 In construing the scheme of review 
contemplated by this statute, the supreme court concluded that the 
superior court should first conduct an APA-style review, examining 
questions of law de novo and questions of fact under the whole 
record test, as in section 150B-51(b). 145 If the superior court 
concludes that the agency’s findings of fact are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, it then has the option either to 
remand the case to the agency for further proceedings or to conduct 
its own new trial on the facts and law in the case.146 The court did 
not comment on the reasons for or wisdom of this complex hybrid of 
judicial review, but its costs are evident.  It took five years and three 
levels of judicial review in Meza before the case was finally 
143 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(k).
144 Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 100 (N.C. 2010).
145 Id. at 102.
146 Id.  It is not clear from the statute whether the superior court has the 
option of exercising de novo review absent a finding that the agency’s decision is 
not supported by substantial evidence, although language appearing in the Meza 
opinion suggests that the superior court always has that option.  See id. at 105
(emphasis added) (“In conclusion, we hold that the standard of review of an agency 
decision under N.C.G.S. § 108A-79(k) is de novo when the superior court exercises 
its statutory authority to ‘take testimony and examine into the facts of the case . . . 
to determine whether the final decision is in error under federal and State law.’  If, 
however, the superior court proceeds solely upon the administrative record, the 
hearing is governed by the provisions of the [APA], in which questions of fact are 
reviewed under the whole record test and questions of law are reviewed de novo.”). 
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remanded to the superior court for a trial using the appropriate 
standard of review. 147
The second problem with these hybrid jurisdictional statutes 
is that their cost is not justified by any clear advantage of a more 
accurate result in the superior courts.  Under section 108A-79(k), the 
superior court has the option to refuse to exercise its original 
jurisdiction and remand to the agency, even when the agency’s 
findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence.148 Thus, the 
hybrid review provides little guarantee of greater procedural 
safeguards to the aggrieved party.
Finally, a de novo trial in the superior court likely would be 
redundant.  When making benefit determinations, the Department of 
Health and Human Services provides administrative hearings subject 
to the contested case provisions of the APA.149 Original jurisdiction 
in the superior court is also a misallocation of judicial resources, as 
the agencies making the initial determination are experts in their 
complex and highly technical areas.  To the extent that these hybrid 
jurisdiction statutes were modeled on the hybrid procedures in former 
section 150B-151(c), those procedures have now been abandoned by 
the legislature and should be abandoned here.150
147 Id. at 98.  The North Carolina Supreme Court finally set forth the 
correct standard of review five years after the Department of Social Services denied 
the petitioner’s application for Medicaid benefits. Id. The supreme court reversed 
the decisions of the appellate and superior courts, finding that the superior court 
had incorrectly applied the statutory standard of review.  Id. at 105–06.
148 See id. at 102 (“[O]nce the superior court determines, based on the
whole record test, that the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence 
in the record and, therefore, cannot support the hearing officer's conclusions of law, 
the court can follow one of two procedures.  The court can remand the case to the
agency for further proceedings, or the court can take evidence, make findings of 
fact, and draw its own conclusions of law from the findings thus made.”).
149 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(a)–(j) (2013) (providing for 
a hearing after a denial of benefits with a right to appeal to the Department).  The 
Medical Board is also subject to the contested case provisions of the APA.  N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 90-14.1 (providing for a hearing after a denial of a license to practice 
medicine); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.2 (2013) (providing for a hearing concerning 
proposed disciplinary action by the Medical Board); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(e) 
(mandating that “[t]he contested case provisions of [the] Chapter apply to all 
agencies and all proceedings not expressly exempted from the Chapter”).
150 See Meza, 692 S.E.2d at 101 (noting that the hybrid procedures in 
section 108A-79(k) resemble the hybrid procedures of the now-repealed section 
150B-51(c)).
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While it has never been construed in a reported opinion, two 
statutes governing appeals from the licensing and disciplinary 
decisions of the North Carolina Medical Board also appear to confer 
a form of hybrid jurisdiction.151 As previously noted, these statutes 
pre-date the APA.152
The legislature should revise all of these statutes to conform 
to the review provisions of the APA, conferring only appellate 
jurisdiction in the superior court. 
c. Initial Decision Not Made by an Agency or Officer in the 
Executive Branch
Another group of statutes that confer original jurisdiction in 
the reviewing court governs quasi-administrative actions taken by 
government entities that are not agencies or officers in the state 
executive branch.  For purposes of applying the APA, section 150B-
2(1a) defines “agency” as “an agency or officer in the executive 
branch of the government of this State,” but specifically excludes any 
“local unit of government” and implicitly excludes any departments 
of the legislative or judicial branches. 153 Thus, licensing, 
registration, or other decisions made initially at the county level are 
not subject to the contested case requirements of the APA.  However, 
because the conferral of original jurisdiction commits judicial 
resources, it is appropriate to discuss these statutes in the context of 
other administrative appeals.  
151 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-14.1, 90-14.10; see supra note 140 and 
accompanying text.
152 See supra Part III.A.1.a.
153 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(1a).  Three statutes provide for original 
jurisdiction in the superior court of decisions made initially by a district court or the 
clerk of the superior court.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28.5(e) (review of district 
court’s entry of forfeiture of a motor vehicle is heard in the superior court de novo); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-37(c) (review of clerk of court’s appointment of a 
personal representative for a recipient of public assistance is made by superior 
court, “de novo without a jury”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 111-30 (review of clerk of 
court’s appointment of a personal representative for a recipient of aid to the blind is 
made by superior court, “de novo without a jury”).  Because these statutes deal 
with decisions made wholly within the judicial department of the state, they are 
outside the scope of this Article.
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The following statutes provide for original jurisdiction over 
appeals from decisions not made in the first instance by agencies of 
the state:
Section 7A-250(c)154—vesting original jurisdiction in the 
district court over appeals from the rulings of county 
game commissions; 
Section 67-4.1155—appeals from a local animal control 
board declaring a dog to be “potentially dangerous.”
The rationale for giving original jurisdiction to the judicial 
branch in appeals from these matters is presumably156 to ensure that 
the aggrieved party receives at least one hearing with strong 
procedural safeguards, as decisions made by the lower tribunal are 
not governed by APA procedures.  For several reasons, these statutes 
should be revised to vest appellate, not original, jurisdiction in the 
superior court.
First, as noted above, section 7A-250(c) is obsolete.157 It was 
enacted in 1965; it predates the APA and the 1979 reorganization of 
the state’s wildlife laws, which stripped all but two county 
governments (Dare and Currituck) of control over wildlife 
management and vested control in the North Carolina Wildlife 
Resources Commission, a state agency. 158 The two remaining 
functional county game commissions issue licenses for duck hunting 
blinds. 159 Arguably, the licenses implicate important individual 
154 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(c); see supra note 137 and accompanying 
text.
155 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1(c) (“The appeal shall be heard de novo 
before a superior court judge sitting in the county in which the appellate Board 
whose ruling is being appealed is located.”); Caswell Cnty. v. Hanks, 462 S.E.2d
841, 842–43 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (trial court reversed for not conducting de novo
trial).
156 There is no relevant legislative history for most of these statutes and 
thus the reasons for the prescribed judicial review standard must be presumed in 
most cases.  Legislative history will be cited where available and relevant.
157 See supra Part III.A.1.a.
158 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-133.1.  See generally About North Carolina 
Wildlife Resources Commission, N.C. WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMMISSION,
http://www.ncwildlife.org/about.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
159 About the Commission, CURRITUCK CNTY. GAME COMM’N,
http://www.currituckgamecommission.org/About%20The%20Commission.html 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013); Game and Wildlife Commission, DARE CNTY.,
http://www.darenc.com/gov/brdlist_gw.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
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interests—the ability to shoot ducks from behind a duck blind160—
and the consequences of erroneous deprivation are severe—the
potential loss of a season of duck hunting.  However, given that the 
applications for such licenses have no discretionary elements,161 there 
is only a small chance that a de novo trial in the district court will add 
significantly to a more accurate result. Finally, while trials de novo
of the orders of these two game commissions are unlikely to cause a 
significant drain on the resources of the court, it makes little sense, in 
the context of objective licensing decisions, to provide for original, 
rather than appellate, jurisdiction.
Second, the statutes build costly redundancy into the system 
without justifying the cost of duplicative superior court proceedings.  
For example, section 67-4.1 vests original jurisdiction in the superior 
court over appeals from the order of a local animal control board 
declaring a dog to be “dangerous” or “potentially dangerous.”162 The 
statute anticipates a two-stage process at the local level: an initial 
determination following an investigation, and in the event of an 
appeal by the dog owner, a final determination following a hearing 
before a board.163 Thus, by the time the owner files an appeal in the 
superior court, she has already had the benefit of two administrative 
determinations and it is not clear that a new trial in the superior court 
is justified.  Weighing in favor of original jurisdiction, the owner has 
a strong interest in avoiding the additional burden of owning a dog 
160 See, e.g., Joe Balog, Part Three: Interview with Phil Robertson,
WATERFOWL & RETRIEVER (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.grandviewoutdoors.com/duck-
hunting/articlecontent/11/2010/1481/part-three:-interview-with-phil-robertson 
(conveying eponymous advice from Phil Robertson, duck hunting guru).
161 See, e.g., 2013/2014 Blind License Application, DARE CNTY., available 
at http://www.darenc.com/gov/brdlist_gw_license.pdf (requiring the applicant to 
verify her name, address, and North Carolina hunting license number, to provide a 
description of the requested location of the duck blind, and pay a fee).
162 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1 (“The appeal shall be heard de novo before a 
superior court judge sitting in the county in which the appellate Board whose ruling 
is being appealed is located.”); Caswell Cnty. v. Hanks, 462 S.E.2d 841, 842–43
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (trial court reversed for not conducting de novo trial).
163 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1(c); see, e.g., Guide to Dangerous and
Potentially Dangerous Dog Classification, ORANGE CNTY. ANIMAL SERVS.,
http://www.ocfl.net/Portals/0/Library/Animals-Pets/docs/DangerousDogs.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the procedures in Orange County, which involve 
a hearing prior to the initial determination and a hearing before the board, before 
appeal to the district court).
Fall 2013 Simplifying the Standard of Review 625
that has been adjudged dangerous or potentially dangerous.  
Furthermore, since this kind of determination is likely to have a 
contested factual record, the additional truth-finding procedures of a 
superior court may improve the accuracy of the outcome.  
On the other side of the balance, the consequences of the local 
board decision are not severe.  A dog owner incurs some costs if the 
dog is labeled dangerous (e.g., for microchipping the dog and taking 
a class on responsible ownership), but does not necessarily lose 
ownership of the dog. 164 Furthermore, the costs of original 
jurisdiction to the court system may be significant.  These costs 
include the time and expense of conducting a trial de novo and also 
the confusion caused by an anomalous statute.165 Unlike many of the 
statutes vesting original jurisdiction in the superior court, section 67-
4.1 resulted in one appellate court decision, which overturned and 
remanded a case to the superior court for failing to review the 
decision of the animal control board de novo. 166 That litigation, 
which required a written opinion from the appellate court and two 
hearings before a superior court judge, is perhaps the “poster child” 
of needlessly costly and duplicative proceedings that are avoidable 
by authorizing the superior court to engage in appellate review of the 
order, rather than conduct a de novo hearing.
Accordingly, these statutes should be changed, eliminating 
the provision for original jurisdiction in the reviewing courts and 
replacing it with appellate jurisdiction.   
d. Agency Decision Made Without an Opportunity for In-Person 
Hearing
Four statutes confer original jurisdiction over decisions 
initially made by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and its 
Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), in circumstances where the 
aggrieved party was denied a license or permit without an 
opportunity for a hearing: 
164 See, e.g., Guide to Dangerous and Potentially Dangerous Dog 
Classification, supra note 163 (describing the consequences of having a dog 
adjudicated as “potentially dangerous” or “dangerous”).
165 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1.
166 Caswell, 462 S.E.2d at 842–43 (trial court reversed for not conducting 
de novo trial).
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Section 136-134.1167—appeals from denial or revocation 
of an outdoor advertising permit; 
Section 136-149.1168—appeals from denial or revocation 
of a permit for a junkyard located near a highway; 
Section 20-25169—appeals from a discretionary revocation 
of a driver’s license; and 
Section 20-279.2 170 —appeals from the suspension or 
revocation of an uninsured motorist’s license.
The DOT is exempt from the contested case requirements of 
the APA,171 and thus the rationale for vesting original jurisdiction to 
the superior court is presumably to ensure that the aggrieved party 
eventually gets a hearing with procedural safeguards.  Under the 
Outdoor Advertising Control Act, for example, the Secretary has the 
power to issue, deny, or revoke permits for building or maintaining 
billboards along DOT-controlled roads.172 An engineer makes an 
initial determination on all permit applications; denials and 
revocations can be appealed to the Secretary, who makes a final 
determination based on the individual’s written application, the 
167 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-134.1 (“The review of the decision of the 
Secretary of Transportation under this Article shall be conducted by the court 
without a jury and shall hear the matter de novo pursuant to the rules of evidence as 
applied in the General Court of Justice.”); Powell v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 704 
S.E.2d 547, 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming that the superior court has original 
jurisdiction and is “not bound by the agency’s findings and conclusions”).
168 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-149.1 (“The review of the decision of the 
Secretary of Transportation under this Article shall be conducted by the court 
without a jury and shall hear the matter de novo pursuant to the rules of evidence as 
applied in the General Court of Justice.”).
169 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-25; see supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
170 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b) (“Any person aggrieved by an order or 
act of the Commissioner requiring a suspension or revocation of his license under 
the provisions of this Article, . . . may file a petition in the superior court of the 
county in which the petitioner resides for a review . . . .  At the hearing upon the 
petition the judge shall sit without the intervention of a jury and shall receive such 
evidence as shall be deemed by the judge to be relevant and proper. . . .  The matter 
shall be heard de novo . . . .”); see State v. Martin, 186 S.E.2d 647, 648 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1972) (noting that “ample” review of revocation is provided by statute).
171 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(e)(8).
172 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-130.
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engineer’s decision, and any supporting documents.173 There are no 
provisions for an oral hearing at the agency level and thus a trial in 
the superior court is the litigant’s first opportunity to contest the 
agency’s decision in person.  Similarly, there is no opportunity for a 
hearing before the Commissioner of the DMV before one’s license is, 
for example, revoked because of a conviction in another state,174 or 
suspended under the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial 
Responsibility Act.175
These DOT statutes, which accord no agency-level hearings, 
are inconsistent with the way that most licensing and permitting 
decisions by state agencies are made and should be carefully 
reviewed to see whether the anomaly is worth preserving. 176 A
license to conduct business or to drive generally implicates important 
individual interests; the significance of these interests is reflected in 
the APA’s general grant of agency-level hearings to applicants and 
licensees.177 In a more typical licensing regime—for example, for 
pharmacists—a person whose license is revoked or whose application 
is denied can challenge the agency’s action in a contested case, which 
results in a final decision.  The aggrieved party then appeals the final 
decision to the superior court, invoking its appellate jurisdiction.178
173 19A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2E.0213 (2013).  The Secretary has not yet 
promulgated rules regarding his control of junkyards.  
174 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-23 (“The Division may revoke the license of any 
resident of this State upon receiving notice of the person’s conviction in another 
state of an offense set forth in G.S. 20-26(a).”) (emphasis added).
175 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.5(b) (“The Commissioner shall, within 
60 days after the receipt of such report of a motor vehicle accident, suspend the 
license of each operator and each owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved 
in such accident . . . .”) (emphasis added).
176 Compare N.C .GEN. STAT. § 20-279.5(b), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
150B-3.
177 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-3 (setting limits on an agency’s ability to 
deny or revoke a license in the absence of specific statutory requirements).
178 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.38 (authorizing the Board of 
Pharmacy to revoke or refuse to grant a license, consistent with the provisions of 
150B).  While the statute does not specify that the aggrieved party can appeal the 
decision, the party may petition for review in the superior court.  See CVS 
Pharmacy, Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Pharmacy, 591 S.E.2d 567, 569–70 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004) (noting that CVS filed a petition for review of the Board’s decisions and that 
the superior court correctly applied whole record review). 
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There are several reasons that counsel in favor of changing 
the DOT statutes to reflect more typical state licensing practices.  
First, two of the DOT statutes predate the enactment of the APA.179
The legislature should consider whether this outdated statutory 
scheme—and perhaps even the DOT’s blanket exemption from the 
APA—has continued validity.  Second, as previously noted, licenses 
generally implicate important individual interests; the consequences 
of erroneous deprivation, particularly of a driver’s license, can be 
severe (for example, for anyone who relies on their driver’s license 
for their employment).  Accordingly, the more typical licensing 
scheme, which includes an appeal from the initial determination and 
a hearing at the agency level,180 would provide additional procedural 
protections for the aggrieved party without straining judicial 
resources.  Finally, because the superior courts have the inherent 
authority to give appellate review to agency licensing decisions, such 
a revision would be consistent with the long tradition of North 
Carolina law to vest appellate, not original, jurisdiction in the courts 
over the review of DOT decisions.181
Accordingly, these statutes should be revised for consistency 
with other state licensing schemes, and to vest appellate, not original, 
jurisdiction in the superior courts. 
e. Review Provisions in the North Carolina Business 
Corporations Act and North Carolina Business Nonprofit Act
Another group of statutes that confer original jurisdiction on 
the superior courts appears in the North Carolina Business 
Corporations Act (BCA), the Business Nonprofit Act (BNA), and the 
Filings, Names and Registered Agents Act182:
179 See supra Part III.A.1.a.
180 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-3.
181 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(e)(8).  Appellate review of agency 
licensing decisions is a well-established norm.  Long before the APA was enacted, 
the North Carolina courts reviewed petitions regarding certain licensing decisions 
based on their “inherent authority to review the discretionary action of any 
administrative agency, whenever such action affects personal or property rights, 
upon a prima facie showing, by petition for a writ of certiorari, that such agency 
has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in disregard of law.”  In re Wright, 46 S.E.2d 
696, 698 (N.C. 1948) (reviewing the suspension of a driver’s license).
182 See Appendix and accompanying text for language of statutes. 
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Sections 55-15-32(a) and 55A-15-32(a)—appeals of a 
foreign corporation or nonprofit from the Secretary of 
State’s revocation of a license to do business in the state;
Sections 55-14-23(b) and 55A-14-23(b)—appeals of a 
foreign corporation or nonprofit from the Secretary of 
State’s denial of an application to be reinstated; and
Section 55D-16(a)—appeals from the Secretary of State’s 
refusal to file documents submitted by a corporation or 
nonprofit organization.
These statutes all provide, in similar language, “The appeal to the 
superior court shall be determined by a judge of the superior court 
upon such further evidence, notice and opportunity to be heard, if 
any, as the court may deem appropriate under the circumstances.”183
While the statutes do not use the phrase “de novo,” and have not yet 
been construed in a reported opinion, they appear to mandate original 
jurisdiction because they direct the superior court to make its 
determination “upon such further evidence, notice and opportunity to 
be heard” as the court deems appropriate, and the power to take new 
evidence is the hallmark of original jurisdiction.184 The statutes also 
give the superior court power to order the Secretary to take the 
requested action.185
These statutes have not yet resulted in a reported case and 
thus it is unlikely that they are causing a strain on judicial resources.  
They nevertheless merit review for conformity with the APA for two 
reasons.  First, it is not clear that de novo jurisdiction is warranted in 
the circumstances addressed by the statute.  On the one hand, the 
Secretary makes her initial decision on a paper record, without an in-
person hearing, and original jurisdiction in the superior court 
provides procedural safeguards for the aggrieved party.  On the other 
hand, the consequences of erroneous deprivation are not severe 
because the corporation or nonprofit can correct the mistakes in its 
application and re-file. 186 Further, the additional procedures 
183 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-15-32(a).
184 In re Dunn, 326 S.E.2d 309, 311–12 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-15-32(a) (emphasis added).
185 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-15-32(b), 55A-15-32(b), 55-14-23(c), 55A-14-
23(c), 55D-16(b).
186 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-05 (describing the effect of 
administrative dissolution of a corporation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-22
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available in the superior court are not likely to provide a significant 
improvement in accuracy for this kind of determination: the 
Secretary has very little discretion in revoking a business license, 
denying reinstatement of a business license, or refusing to file 
documents,187 and because the statute requires objective information 
about the applicant, decisions of this kind are unlikely to involve 
disputed facts.  Thus the superior court’s power of mandamus (to 
order the secretary to grant reinstatement, for example), in 
combination with the power to remand if the Secretary’s decision is 
arbitrary and capricious, is likely adequate to protect the aggrieved 
party’s rights. 
Second, the statutory language in the BCA and BNA is, 
apparently, sui generis; it has never been construed by a court, there 
is no similar language in comparable statutes from this state or 
others, and, because it is anomalous, untried, and untested, it is 
potentially confusing and could lead to protracted litigation.188 Even 
if it is advisable for the superior courts to have original jurisdiction in 
these appeals, the statute should be revised to more clearly confer 
original jurisdiction.
(permitting corporation that has been administratively dissolved to apply for 
reinstatement); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-15-31 (permitting Secretary to grant a new 
certificate of authority to a corporation that has corrected all of the grounds for 
revocation of its prior certificate); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55D-15(d) (specifying that 
the Secretary’s refusal to file a document does not, in most cases, affect the validity 
of the document). 
187 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-22(a)(2).  The Secretary must grant 
the application for reinstatement if the corporation has correctly provided its name, 
its date of administrative dissolution, and stated that the grounds for dissolution 
“either did not exist or have been eliminated.”
188 There is an echo of the language in a 1953 Motor Vehicles statute 
conferring original jurisdiction.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b) (“At the hearing 
upon the petition the judge shall sit without the intervention of a jury and shall 
receive such evidence as shall be deemed by the judge to be relevant and proper.”); 
see supra Part III.A.1.d.  The Uniform Commercial Code uses similar language in 
its judicial review statute, but omits the word “evidence,” suggesting that it 
contemplates appellate jurisdiction in the reviewing court.  In an interview, 
however, the chairman of the BCA Drafting Committee indicated that the 
committee did not use existing statutory language as a model for the 1989 revisions 
to the BCA.  Telephone Interview with Russell M. Robinson, II, Founding Partner, 
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. and Author, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA 
CORPORATION LAW (Permanent Edition, 2002) (July 17, 2012).  
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2. No Revision Recommended
Two of the statutes that confer original jurisdiction in the 
superior courts implicate the rights of voters or candidates for 
political office.  Because of the significant rights at stake in all 
matters involving voting and ballot access, no change is 
recommended to these statutes:
Section 163-82.18 189 —appeals from a denial of voter 
registration by the county board of election; and 
Section 163-278.26 190 —appeals from the denial of a 
declaration of nomination or certificate of election by the 
State Board of Elections.
County boards of election, which are exempt from the APA, 
must follow statutorily mandated procedures before denying a voter 
registration application.191 Section 163-82.18 specifically protects an 
individual’s right to notice and a “prompt and fair” hearing before the 
board and also gives subpoena power to the board.192 The superior 
court reviews the county board’s denial of registration de novo.193
While an argument can be made against original jurisdiction of such 
appeals, because the frustrated applicant for registration is entitled to 
a hearing before the county board, the balance here tips in favor of 
original jurisdiction in the superior court because of the fundamental 
right at stake—the individual’s right to vote—and because the 
189 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18(c) (“Any person aggrieved by a final 
decision of a county board of elections denying registration may at any time within 
10 days from the date on which he receives notice of the decision appeal to the 
superior court of the county in which the board is located. . . . [T]he matter shall be 
heard de novo in the superior court in the manner in which other civil actions are 
tried and disposed of in that court.”).
190 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.26 (“Any candidate for nomination or 
election who is denied a declaration of nomination or certificate of election, 
pursuant to G.S. 163-278.25, may . . . appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County 
for a final determination of any questions of law or fact which may be involved in 
the Board’s action” and “[o]n appeal, the cause shall be heard de novo.”).
191 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18(a)–(b).
192 Id. (giving the individual the right to appeal from an initial denial of 
registration, requiring a de novo hearing before at least two members of the county 
board, and requiring the board to issue a written order within five days of the 
hearing).
193 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18(c).
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consequences of an erroneous denial are significant (the individual 
may be wrongfully denied the right to vote in an upcoming election).
There is also a good argument for the superior courts to have 
original jurisdiction over denials by the State Board of Elections of a 
declaration of nomination or certificate of election for a candidate for 
political office, based on the candidate’s failure to file required 
financial and organizational statements with the board.194 Applicants 
are not entitled to a hearing before the Board prior to a final denial 
and thus a de novo hearing in the superior court does not duplicate 
the proceedings before the Board.  Further, there is a significant 
interest at stake—the individual’s interest in running for political 
office 195 —and the consequences of an erroneous denial are 
significant (the individual may be wrongfully prevented from running 
as a candidate in an upcoming election).  Accordingly, original 
jurisdiction in the superior court should be preserved in these 
statutes.
B. Agency-Specific Judicial Review Statutes Conferring 
Appellate Jurisdiction on the Superior Courts
Finally, there are numerous agency-specific statutes that 
confer appellate jurisdiction over administrative appeals in the 
superior courts.196 These statutes confer appellate jurisdiction in one 
of several ways: by either explicitly referencing the APA,197 by using 
194 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.25 (providing that the Board will not 
issue a declaration of nomination or certificate of election until the candidate has 
filed required statements); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.24 (requiring the 
Board to determine that statements conform to “law and to the truth” within four 
months of their submission); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.9 (listing some of the 
statements that must be filed with the Board of Elections).
195 The right to run for office is not clearly established as a fundamental 
constitutional right.  However, scholars, and some courts, have argued that it 
should be established as such, given that it implicates the first amendment rights of 
voters, candidates, and political parties.  See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, The
Dimensions of the Newly Emergent, Quasi-Fundamental Right to Political 
Candidacy, 6 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 (1981); James S. Jardine, Ballot Access 
Rights: The Constitutional Status of the Right to Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L.
REV. 290 (1974).
196 See Appendix.
197 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-123 (“Any person directly affected by 
any final decision or order of the Commission under this Part may appeal such 
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language that is similar to or compatible with the jurisdiction 
conferred by the APA,198 or through silence—by not mentioning any 
right or standard of review199—and thereby defaulting to the APA.  
For the sake of consistency, these statutes should be revised to make 
crystal clear that the jurisdiction conferred is appellate.
The simplest way to accomplish consistency might be to 
remove all references to the appellate jurisdiction of the superior 
courts in agency-specific statutes; in that event, the APA would 
provide the standard of review by default.200 But short of removing 
all references to appellate jurisdiction, the statutes that specifically 
provide for appellate review should be revised to use language that 
mimics or specifically references the APA.  For example, an agency-
specific statute can confer jurisdiction with a citation to section 
150B, Article 4, as in section 90–210.69: “Judicial review shall be 
pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.”201
There are several problems with the use of inconsistent 
terminology in agency-specific review statutes.  First, in the statutes 
conferring original jurisdiction, it is easy to confuse the court’s 
power to hear a case “de novo”—i.e., to take new evidence in the 
case—with the court’s power to review an agency decision “de 
novo”—i.e., to give a non-deferential review to the record.  As 
previously noted, to invoke the superior court’s original jurisdiction, 
a statute must specifically use language that directs the superior court 
to take new evidence or examine evidence anew.202 Some agency-
specific statutes invoke original jurisdiction in just that manner, by 
instructing that on appeal the superior court must “take testimony and 
decision or order to the superior court . . . pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 
150B”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53C-2-6(c) (specifying that the standard of review 
“shall be as provided in G.S. 150B-51(b)”).
198 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-35 (specifically stating that “findings of 
the Commissioner as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, are 
conclusive”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-75 (specifying that the appeal shall be heard 
“as a civil case upon transcript of the record for review of findings of fact and 
errors of law only”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-45 (listing grounds for appeal similar 
to those in the APA).
199 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-500 (“Any party may appeal to the 
superior court from any final order of the Commissioner [of Agriculture].”).
200 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43.
201 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.69.
202 See supra Part II.A.
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examine into the facts.” 203 Other agency-specific statutes confer 
original jurisdiction by requiring that the matter shall be heard de 
novo204 in the superior court, or de novo “without a jury.”205 The use 
of the term de novo in the statutes conferring original jurisdiction is 
potentially confusing because, whereas in this context it refers to 
original jurisdiction and the power to find the facts of the case as if 
they had never been tried before, in other contexts (such as section 
150B-51), the term describes one of the standards of review within 
the superior court’s appellate jurisdiction. 206 If the legislature 
continues to confer original jurisdiction over administrative appeals, 
it would be preferable for the statutes that confer such jurisdiction on
the superior courts to avoid the term de novo and instead instruct the 
superior court to take new testimony in the case.
Second, the variety of statutory language used to confer 
appellate jurisdiction in the superior courts, and the judicial 
construction of such statutes, can cause uncertainty about the 
standards the court must apply.  For example, under section 58-2-75, 
the orders and decisions of the Commissioner of Insurance are 
reviewed “by the trial judge as a civil case upon transcript of the 
record for review of findings of fact and errors of law only.”207 Six 
other statutes208 specify that the judicial review of agency action is 
203 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-25 (in appeal from denial, cancellation, or 
suspension of a motor vehicle license, superior court is authorized to “take 
testimony and examine into the facts of the case”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79 (in 
appeal from social services agency, superior court is authorized to “take testimony 
and examine into the facts of the case”).
204 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28.5 (appeal from forfeiture of impounded 
motor vehicle or funds).  
205 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-134.1 (appeal from final decision of 
Secretary of Transportation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18 (1957) (appeal from 
denial of voter registration).
206 See supra Part II.B.2.
207 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-75 (2013).  Section 58-2-75 was enacted 
in 1945.  1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 383.
208 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-19-70 (“Any person aggrieved by any order 
made by the [Insurance] Commissioner pursuant to this Article may appeal in 
accordance with G.S. 58-2-75.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-28-20(e) (“Any person 
required to cease and desist violating G.S. 58-28-5 by an order issued after notice 
and a hearing under subsection (a) or (d) of this section may seek judicial review of 
that order under G.S. 58-2-75.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-40-25 (“The insurance 
public protection classifications established by the [Insurance] Commissioner 
issued pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall be subject to appeal as
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governed by section 58-2-75; one of those statutes even specifies that 
review should be made pursuant to section 58-2-75 and that “Chapter 
150B [the APA] . . . does not apply” to appeals from that section.209
Section 58-2-75 essentially provides for appellate review of the 
Commissioner’s orders and, according to section 150B-43, should 
control unless it prescribes an inadequate form of review.210
But the courts have held otherwise.211 Despite finding that 
the jurisdiction conferred by section 58-2-75 and the type of review it 
prescribes is “virtually identical” to that in section 150B-51,212 the 
Court of Appeals has held that the APA is the controlling judicial 
review statute in appeals from decisions of the Insurance 
Commission and that it will apply section 58-2-75 only to the extent 
that it “adds to and is consistent with the judicial review function of 
[section] 150B-51.”213 However, it is not evident that section 58-2-
75 adds anything to or is in any way inconsistent with section 150B-
51, as it is “virtually identical” to the APA.214 This treatment of 
section 58-2-75 is unduly complicated and contradicts the mandate in 
section 150B-43 that the APA controls “unless adequate procedure 
for judicial review is provided by another statute, in which case the 
review shall be under such other statute.”215 In other words, the APA 
should control only if the judicial review provided in section 58-2-75 
is inadequate.  
provided in G.S. 58-2-75, et seq.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-50 (“All persons or 
insureds aggrieved by any order or decision of the [Insurance] Commissioner may 
appeal as is provided in G.S. 58-2-75.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-132 (“An appeal 
from a final decision and order of the [Insurance] Commissioner under this section 
shall be conducted pursuant to G.S. 58-2-75.  Chapter 150B of the General Statutes 
does not apply to the procedures of G.S. 58-65-131, this section, and G.S. 58-65-
133.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-196 (“Appeals of the [Industrial] Commissioner’s 
orders under this section shall be governed by G.S. 58-2-75.”).
209 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-132.
210 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (providing that judicial review shall be 
under the APA “unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by 
another statute, in which case the review shall be under such other statute”).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has also indicated that it 
will treat statutes enacted before and after the APA differently.216
When an agency-specific review statute was enacted prior to the 
APA and confers jurisdiction comparable to section 150B-51, the 
Supreme Court has found that section 150B-51 controls; but when 
the comparable agency-specific review statute was enacted after the 
APA, the Court has found that the specific statute controls.217
Regarding section 58-2-75 and the statutes that refer to it, the 
legislature should amend the statute to clarify whether it or section 
150B-51 controls.  The legislature should also amend all statutory 
provisions that confer, in different language, jurisdiction that is 
virtually identical to the APA.  The legislature should either clarify 
that the statute should be construed as being fully consistent with the 
APA—and therefore provides for adequate review and controls—or 
should provide that review be in accordance with Article 4 of the 
APA.
Finally, the legislature should review and consider amending 
all of the statutes that refer to “any competent evidence.”218 To the 
extent that this standard applies to agencies that are subject to the 
APA, the standard is likely superseded by the substantial evidence 
test of section 150B-51.  A legislative amendment will help to avoid 
confusion and protracted litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION 
In its current form, Article 4 of the North Carolina APA 
envisions a uniform and simple model of judicial review: by default, 
all appeals from administrative decisions or orders are reviewed in 
the superior court, invoking its appellate jurisdiction, under either the 
de novo or whole record standard of review, depending on the type of 
errors asserted by the aggrieved party.219 But there are currently too 
many deviations from this norm, mostly created by agency-specific 
judicial review statutes.  The costs imposed by confusing or 
216 See In re Appeal of McElwee, 283 S.E.2d 115, 120 (N.C. 1981).
217 Id. (finding that judicial review provision in section 105-345.2, enacted 
six years after the enactment of the APA, is equal to that under the APA and the 
controlling judicial review statute for appeals from the Property Tax Commission).
218 See supra Part II.B.3.a.
219 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43 to -57.
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unnecessarily stringent judicial review statutes burden judges, 
agencies, and litigants alike.  
The legislature should follow through with its goal of creating 
“a uniform system of administrative rulemaking and adjudicatory 
procedure for agencies”220 by reviewing and amending the general 
statutes to promote consistency with the APA.  This Article has 
argued that the legislature should amend all but two of the statutes 
that confer original jurisdiction on the reviewing courts, conferring 
appellate jurisdiction instead, and should also amend the current 
array of agency-specific review statutes to use language that more 
clearly and simply confers APA-style appellate jurisdiction on the 
reviewing court.
Most of these changes are not radical; the legislature could 
significantly improve the uniformity of judicial review statutes just 
by updating obsolete statutes, modernizing archaic language, and 
standardizing the statutory language used to confer jurisdiction on the 
superior courts.  Some of the changes—such as revising the 
jurisdiction of DOT appeals from original to appellate—are more 
radical and should be made only after a careful study of the entire 
context of the DOT’s administrative procedure.  Any changes made 
should ultimately facilitate the orderly judicial review process 
envisioned by the APA and desired by the North Carolina Supreme 
Court.
220 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1. 

















Appeals from rulings of 
county game 
commissions shall be 
heard in the district court 
division.  The appeal 
shall be heard de novo 
before a district court 
judge sitting in the 
county in which the 
game commission whose 







of appeal to 
court
Any person denied a 
license or whose license 
has been canceled, 
suspended or revoked by 
the Division, except 
where such cancellation 
is mandatory under the 
provisions of this Article, 
shall have a right to file a 
petition within 30 days 
thereafter for a hearing in 
the matter in the superior 
court of the county 
wherein such person 
shall reside, . . . and such 
court or judge is hereby 
vested with jurisdiction 
and it shall be its or his 
duty to set the matter for 
hearing upon 30 days' 
written notice to the 
Division, and thereupon 
to take testimony and 
examine into the facts of 
the case, and to 
determine whether the 
petitioner is entitled to a 
license or is subject to 
suspension, cancellation 
or revocation of license 
Original III(A)(1) 
(a), (d)
221 All references are made to the 2013 version of the North Carolina 
General Statutes.  
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The matter shall be heard 
de novo and the judge 
shall enter his order 
affirming the act or order 
of the Commissioner, or 
modifying same, 
including the amount of 
bond or security to be 













The appeal to the 
superior court shall be 
determined by a judge of 
the superior court upon 
such further evidence, 
notice and opportunity to 
be heard, if any, as the 
court may deem 












The appeal to the 
superior court shall be 
determined by a judge of 
the superior court upon 
such further evidence, 
notice and opportunity to 
be heard, if any, as the 
court may deem 













The appeal to the 
superior court shall be 
determined by a judge of 
the superior court upon 
such further evidence, 
notice, and opportunity 
to be heard, if any, as the 
court may deem 












The appeal to the 
superior court shall be 
determined by a judge of 
the superior court upon 
such further evidence, 
notice, and opportunity 
to be heard, if any, as the 
court may deem 




















The appeal to the 
superior court is not 
governed by Chapter 
150B of the General 
Statutes, the 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, and shall 
be determined by a judge 
of the superior court 
upon such further notice 
and opportunity to be 
heard, if any, as the court 








The appeal shall be heard 
de novo before a superior 












issuance of a 
license
Upon appeal the case 
shall be heard by the 
judge without a jury, 
upon the record, except 
that in cases of alleged 
omissions or errors in the 
record, testimony may be 
taken by the court. The 
decision of the Board 
shall be upheld unless 
the substantial rights of 
the applicant have been 
prejudiced because the 
decision of the Board is 
in violation of law or is 
not supported by any 
evidence admissible 












Upon the review of the 
Board's decision taking 
disciplinary action on a 
license, the case shall be 
heard by the judge 
without a jury, upon the 
record, except that in 
cases of alleged 
omissions or errors in the 
record, testimony 










Upon the revocation or 
suspension of any license 
Original III(A)(1) 
(a)
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or authority by the Board 
of Funeral Service, under 
any of the provisions of 
this Article, the said 
association or individual 
whose license or 
authority has been 
revoked or suspended 
shall have the right of 
appeal. . . .  Within 30 
days after receipt of the 
notice of appeal, the 
Board of Funeral Service 
shall file with the clerk 
of the superior court of 
the county in which the 
appeal is to be heard the 
decision of the Board of 
Funeral Service.  Upon 
receipt of such decision, 
the clerk of superior 
court shall place the 
matter upon the civil 
issue docket of the 
superior court and the 






Any applicant or 
recipient who is 
dissatisfied with the final 
decision of the 
Department may file, 
within 30 days of the 
receipt of notice of such 
decision, a petition for 
judicial review in 
superior court of the 
county from which the 
case arose. . . .  The 
hearing shall be 
conducted according to 
the provisions of Article 
4, Chapter 150B, of the 
North Carolina General 
Statutes.  The court shall, 
on request, examine the 
evidence excluded at the 
hearing under G.S. 
108A-79(e)(4) or G.S. 
108A-79(i)(1) and if the 
evidence was improperly 
Hybrid III(A)(1) 
(b)
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excluded, the court shall 
consider it.  
Notwithstanding the 
foregoing provisions, the 
court may take testimony 
and examine into the 
facts of the case, 
including excluded 
evidence, to determine 
whether the final 
decision is in error under 
federal and State law, 
and under the rules and 
regulations of the Social 
Services Commission or 







The review of the 
decision of the Secretary 
of Transportation under 
this Article shall be 
conducted by the court 
without a jury and shall 
hear the matter de novo 
pursuant to the rules of 
evidence as applied in 









The review of the 
decision of the Secretary 
of Transportation under 
this Article shall be 
conducted by the court 
without a jury and shall 
hear the matter de novo 
pursuant to the rules of
evidence as applied in 











Appeal to Superior 
Court. - Any person 
aggrieved by a final 
decision of a county 
board of elections 
denying registration may 
at any time within 10 
days from the date on 
which he receives notice 
of the decision appeal to 
the superior court of the 
county in which the 
Original III(A)(2)
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board is located.  Upon 
such an appeal, the 
appealing party shall be 
the plaintiff and the 
county board of elections 
shall be the defendant, 
and the matter shall be 
heard de novo in the 
superior court in the 
manner in which other 
civil actions are tried and 










Any candidate for 
nomination or election 
who is denied a 
declaration of 
nomination or certificate 
of election, pursuant to 
G.S. 163-278.25, may, 
within five days after the 
action of the Board under 
that section, appeal to the 
Superior Court of Wake 
County for a final 
determination of any 
questions of law or fact 
which may be involved 
in the Board's action. . . .  
It shall be placed on the 
civil docket of that court 
and shall have 
precedence over all other 
civil actions. . . .
On appeal, the cause 
shall be heard de novo.
Original III(A)(2)
